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Chapter 1: Introduction 
I examine the interplay between political uncertainty and equity volatility coincident with 
US elections. That financial markets are influenced by politics is apparent to all, while the nature 
and magnitude of the equity response to political uncertainty is hotly debated in society and 
academia. I explain how the expectation of exogenous political shocks created by US elections 
impact the equity volatility of firms. Utilizing the unique monopsony-oligopoly business 
environment of military contractors, I construct a sample with a strong link between politics and 
firm growth prospects.
1
 My sample of military contractors is drawn from the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) archival database, to produce a measure of cross-
sectional exposure to the political uncertainty. I combine US military contractor firms’ data, US 
political uncertainty data, and the US election calendar to illustrate the strong positive 
relationship between political uncertainty and equity volatility in the months surrounding US 
elections. My central research question can be broadly stated as; “Does electoral political 
uncertainty inform the equity volatility of military contractors?” 
My extensive literature review links politics, equity volatility, and growth opportunities 
to provide a framework for the analysis. I structure a GARCH (1, 1) model with cross-sectionally 
correlated moments to produce daily firm-election specific volatility measures. This 
methodology facilitates daily firm-level volatility measurement for given a common event date. I 
use this to fit a parsimonious piecewise daily volatility function which produces a predictive 
model with an excellent fit. 
                                                 
 
1
 Politically neutral terminology is used to the extent possible in this research. Firms are referenced as military 
contractors rather than popular but connotation loaded terms such as arms sellers, defense firms, arms-producing and 
military services companies, military-industrial complex, etc… However, when referencing other research or 
publications the terminology originally employed by the author is maintained.  
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My findings link political uncertainty and equity volatility in the months surrounding US 
elections. I find evidence that the equity volatility of military contractors is significantly 
amplified in the months surrounding elections. I demonstrate that election categories: local, 
federal, presidential, midterm, peace-time, and war-time exhibit distinct effects on equity 
volatility, with magnitude of the volatility effect size determined by the election category. 
Specifically, local elections increase cumulative abnormal volatility (CAV) by 11%, midterms 
by 27%, and presidential by 43% above the benchmark level of volatility. This strongly suggests 
that political uncertainty surrounding midterm and even local elections substantially influence 
the equity volatility of military contractors. Furthermore, the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index 
produces a leading indicator of volatility in the four months around elections. My findings 
validate the utility of this newly developed data set for a practical finance application. The 
relationship between political uncertainty and equity volatility among military contractors shares 
some common features but also important differences with prior literature results. 
My results contrast with the extant international evidence regarding equity response to 
elections. While Białkowski, Gottschalk, and Wisniewski (2008) find that markets cumulative 
abnormal volatility (CAV) can double in the weeks following a national election, my sample 
shows that the increase occurs before the election. This is likely the result of the different 
political structures in the US versus the largely parliamentary systems of the international 
samples. However, my results do coincide with the timing of the Pantzalis, Stangeland, and 
Turtle (2000) finding of a positive abnormal return during the two-week period prior to a 
national election week. I present evidence of the daily equity volatility dynamics present around 
US elections.  
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Collectively, my findings illustrate how political uncertainty dictates a substantial portion 
of equity volatility among military contractor firms. These findings have implications that extend 
beyond finance to the realm of political economy, facilitating new avenues of research in 
economics and political science. While extant literature focuses on presidential elections, my 
results indicate that local and Congressional political uncertainty also produce substantial equity 
volatility. My results provide a quantitative measure for the relative importance of US election 
categories to the firm. I provide direct evidence for the unique dynamics of a monopsony-
oligopoly business environment. Ultimately, my equity volatility findings can be applied to 
research in political economy. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Motivation 
The literature review section motivates my hypotheses by developing three key concepts. 
First, I show that US military spending comprises a substantial portion of the US economy and is 
worthy of analysis separate from other industries. Next, I explain how the monopsony-oligopoly 
business environment of military contractors facilitates analysis of the links between policy 
uncertainty and equity volatility. Finally, I explore the extant literature concerning political 
uncertainty and equity markets to provide motivation for my hypotheses and context for my 
results. Together, these three conceptual topics motivation my hypotheses tests in section 3.  
2.1. US Military Spending 
“… War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of 
political commerce …” 
Carl von Clausewitz 
Commander, Prussian War Academy, 1818-1830 
War and politics are inseparable (Clausewitz (1908); Sun (1963)). Since preparation is an 
essential aspect of war, politics also dictates this component of war.
2
 The United States officially 
spent $706 billion dollars on military contracts in 2011, making it the largest military spender in 
the world. With a defense budget in excess of the next top 15 nations combined, the US was 
responsible for 43% of 2011 global military spending.
3
 As a result, the US has a robust military 
contractor industry which produces military goods and services for both domestic use and export 
to allied nations. US military spending is critically important to the domestic economy and a 
                                                 
 
2
 The military philosophy of Sun Tzu (circa 500 BCE) exhorts political leaders to prepare for all aspects of war. War 
preparation is re-emphasized time and again by successful military leaders. 
3
 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex referenced 19FEB2013. The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database provides 
consistent time series on the military spending of 172 countries since 1988. 
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strong military provides insurance to protect the foreign assets of domestic and allied 
international corporations. The US military contractor industry comprised 4.7% of US GDP in 
2011. Thus, the military contractor industry comprises a significant component of the economy 
and is historically much higher during periods of intense military conflict. Despite these 
seemingly large official figures, the actual total cost of military spending may be substantially 
greater because many indirect costs of defense spending are not reported in official government 
statistics.  
Military contractors comprise a major segment of the US economy and are uniquely tied 
to the federal government to a greater extent than any other industry. Game theory helps explain 
this complex dynamic. Bar-El, Kagan, and Tishler (2010) present a theory of defense planning 
which results in a prisoner’s dilemma solution whereby nations arrive at equilibrium 
overspending on the military. Golde and Tishler (2004) model determinants of military 
expenditures and conclude that, “… a highly concentrated oligopoly play[s] an important role in 
determining defense policies and procurement levels in the US and Europe.”  On the supply side, 
the military contractor industry exhibits properties of an oligopoly with only a few firms capable 
of producing a given product class of big-ticket military grade hardware. For example, 
Huntington Ingalls Industries is the sole contractor for nuclear aircraft carriers and one of two 
contractors for nuclear submarines. On the demand side, the US federal government functions as 
a monopsony by purchasing directly or regulating both domestic sales and exports of military 
goods and services. The military contractor cohort is therefore governed by a different set of 
politico-economic forces than any other industry. The uniquely close relationship between 
military contractors and the US federal government is the reason that military contractors present 
an attractive natural experiment.  
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Figure 1 presents the percentages of US military spending in relation to: the entire federal 
budget, US Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and global military spending. The GDP data is from 
the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) and the federal budget data is provided by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). While both the percentages of federal budget and 
GDP spent on the military trend lower over this period, this is primarily a result of increased 
federal non-defense spending and expanded US economic output rather than cuts to defense 
spending. The percentage of US market value (sum of the NYSE, AMEX, & NASDAQ) that is 
represented by these military contractors is also included. This percentage declines in nearly 
monotonic fashion from 11.2% of market value in 1989 to just 3.3% in 2011 as the military 
contractor industry becomes more concentrated. Specifically, this trend is largely a result of large 
companies, such as IBM and General Motors, exiting the military contractor business. This trend 
is consistent with the notion of increased oligopolistic activity among the military contractors. 
From 1989 to 2011, the US federal government maintains a dominant position as the most 
important demand agent, with mean annual purchases totaling 40% of global military spending. 
While this research only focuses on one sector of financial markets, it is a critically important 
component with a unique relationship to the political environment.  
[ Figure 1 about here] 
2.2. The Monopsony-Oligopoly Business Environment 
“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, 
whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous 
rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.” 
Dwight D. Eisenhower 
1
st
 Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1951-1952 
34
th
 President of the United States, 1953-1961 
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The uniquely close relationship between military contractors and the US federal 
government remains strong half a century after President Eisenhower (1960) warned of this 
dynamic. Political connections influence government procurement, even in the US. Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So (2013) explain how firms with a politically connected board of directors are 
improve the allocation of government procurement contracts. In the 1994 Congressional election, 
firms that have boards with partisan connections to the winning (losing) party experience a 
significant and large increase (decrease) in procurement contracts after the election. The federal 
government has a near monopsony for military goods and services, making military contractor 
firms sensitive to political uncertainty. 
Most recently, the 2013 Federal budget sequestration provides ample evidence that 
defense receives different treatment than other government spending priorities. Federal budget 
reporting reflects this dynamic where spending is routinely categorized as defense versus non-
defense spending. The close relationship between the military contractor industry and the federal 
government gives rise to a unique incentive and regulatory environment (see e.g., Agapos and 
Gallaway (1970); Demski and Magee (1992); Rogerson (1989); Rogerson (1992); Rogerson 
(1994); Stigler and Friedland (1971) among others). Leitzel (1992) and Weidenbaum (1968) 
assert that defense procurement exhibits non-competitive characteristics, consistent with theory 
regarding a captured regulator. Responding to this notion, Ke and Gribbon (2009) present 
evidence that the Department of Defense (DOD) achieves its stated goal of targeting profits 
based on the risk level of the military contractor. However, explanations for this unusual 
dynamic in the accounting literature produce inconclusive results.  
Defense firms may respond to the unique business environment by engaging in cost-
shifting accounting practices (Lichtenberg (1992); Thomas and Tung (1992)) or even outright 
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fraud (Karpoff, Lee, and Vendrzyk (1999)). By contrast, McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) do not 
find evidence of cost shifting, attributing unusually high defense contractor profits to non-
accounting explanations. Due to the unique oligopoly-monopsony structure, military contractors 
may have a skewed reward paradigm, driven largely by political forces. Johnson (2005) provides 
an extreme example, asserting that Northrop Grumman supplies parts for the B-2 Stealth Bomber 
from all 50 states to ensure political support for the project. Spending on military contracts is 
highly political, with the goods and services produced often classified. This structure facilitates 
an opaque accounting environment that may shield politicians and military contractors from 
public scrutiny. 
The finance literature is replete with examples of politics directly impacting firms’ 
equity. Using a sample of Indonesian firms, Fisman (2001) shows that political connections can 
be extremely valuable but often amplify equity volatility when the connections are endangered. 
In the US, Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) demonstrate that corporate political 
contributions to both parties and both chambers of Congress are associated with higher equity 
returns, while contributions to Democrats and House candidates provide information for stock 
returns above and beyond that provided in contributions to Republicans and Senate candidates. 
Faccio (2006) and Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) provide evidence supporting the view 
that politically sensitive industries are more likely to have political connections. Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So (2009) demonstrate that politically connected board members have a pervasive 
impact on the value of public companies even within the confine of the strong legal system in the 
United States. Since the equity response should be most pronounced for firms with the greatest 
political sensitivity, military contractors are an excellent choice. 
9 
 
 
 
Military contractor firms are among the most politically sensitive in the economy. Using 
data from the 1992 US presidential elections, Herron, Lavin, Cram, and Silver (1999) find that 
firms in the defense industry are extremely politically sensitive. Using the 2000 presidential 
election, Knight (2007) shows that policy platforms are capitalized into the equity prices of the 
very politically sensitive firms (7% of this sample are defense firms). Huang and Gao (2012) 
report that a greater percentage of defense firms employ lobbyists in Congress than does any 
other industry. The Lockheed Martin produces C-130 aircraft provides an extreme example of 
this the “pork barrel” connection between the military and Congress. From 1978 – 1998, the US 
Air Force requested only five airplanes while the US Congress ordered up 256.
4
 As such, there is 
strong evidence that military contractors belong to the most politically sensitive industry in the 
US economy.  
Military contractors therefore provide an excellent sample of firms for testing the impact 
of politics on equity markets. Finance research has previously employed the natural experiment 
involving political shocks related to the defense industry to test finance theory. In fact, Goyal, 
Lehn, and Racic (2002) employ the defense industry to test capital structure theory precisely 
because of the exogenous effects on military spending that political shifts induce. Belin and 
Guille (2008) employ a similar approach with French defense firms, finding evidence that firms’ 
dependence on defense contracts influences financial structure. Taking inspiration from this prior 
work, I use data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to obtain 
annual firm level estimates of the percentage of total revenue derived from sales to the military. 
                                                 
 
4
 Report to the Honorable John McCain, GAO B-274598 pg 6, 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98108.pdf  
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With this sample, I exploit the unique nature of military contractors to evaluate the impact of US 
federal electoral shocks on equity volatility. 
2.3. Political Uncertainty 
When political uncertainty involves military conflict, equity markets often show extreme 
reactions. Several studies focus on military-conflict induced equity price movements. Amihud 
and Wohl (2004) use “Saddam contracts” to determine how the invasion of Iraq impacted US 
equity markets. They find that the war significantly impacts the S&P 500 and selected industries 
but the study does not explicitly examine military contractors. Rigobon and Sack (2005) employ 
a heteroskedasticity-based estimation technique to demonstrate that “war risk” surrounding the 
invasion of Iraq amplified US equity market volatility. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2009) use the 
‘Saddam Security’ financial instrument to predict stock market and oil price responses to the Iraq 
War. They find the US stock market is extremely sensitive to changes in the probability of war. 
Bittlingmayer (1998) uses the political uncertainty in Germany leading up to WWII to gage the 
impact of politics on stock price volatility. He presents a convincing case that shows how 
political uncertainty drives market volatility, concluding that “Politics matter”. Ultimately, 
politics dictate a large portion of equity returns, particularly when the politics involve military 
conflict. 
Presidential politics have received much attention in the finance and economics literature 
while Congressional politics are largely ignored. Niederhoffer, Gibbs, and Bullock (1970) assert 
that, “Hardly any topic in market folklore receives more attention than the relation between 
presidential elections and the stock market.” Riley and Luksetich (1980) find limited evidence 
that markets prefer Republican presidents, at least in the short run. By contrast, in US 
presidential elections, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) provide evidence that the stock market 
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fares 9% better when the President of the United States is a Democrat rather than a Republican, 
with the difference being most apparent in smaller firms. They conclude that the performance 
differential stems from unexpected returns. Li and Born (2006) conclude that presidential 
political uncertainty is observed by and priced in the equity market. Mukherjee and Leblang 
(2007) show that US and UK partisan administrations do influence nominal interest rates and 
stock market volatility but do not statistically impact the mean level of stock prices. Leblang and 
Mukherjee (2005) present a model of speculative trading around national elections and find 
evidence that financial markets are highly sensitive to partisan (i.e. left vs. right) politics at the 
executive level (i.e. presidential or prime minister). This focus on presidential politics in the 
literature even extends to military contractors. Perhaps the military contractor industry maintains 
a partisan bias; consider the long-standing belief that Republican presidents are more closely 
aligned with the military than are Democrats. Homaifar, Randolph, Helms, and Haddad (1988) 
test this impact of presidential politics on the defense industry but find little evidence that price 
changes in defense industry stocks are associated with the political party of the president. There 
is a large volume of literature on the relationship between the executive branch of government 
(president/prime minister) and financial markets, but much less research investigates partisan 
Congressional uncertainty. 
While presidential party politics is clearly an important channel that impacts equity, 
Congressional channels and the interaction between the branches of government play an essential 
role as well. Congress has the ultimate federal budget authority and the majority political party in 
each chamber appoints the various committee chairs who control the flow of legislation. This 
Congressional power dynamic impacts firms directly, regardless of the president’s party. Since 
budgets originate in the legislature, national elections that change the party in control of one or 
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both chambers of Congress may materially impact federal spending priorities. Only recently does 
finance literature explore Congressional election impacts on stock price returns. Jones and 
Banning (2009) find no significant differences in monthly stock market returns based on party 
political control resulting from presidential and/or Congressional elections. Kim, Pantzalis, and 
Park (2012) present strong empirical evidence showing that firms benefit when their local 
Congressional officials are members of the president’s party. While the president is the 
commander-in-chief of the military, Congress is responsible for military budget appropriations, 
thus partisan Congressional political uncertainty may also generate substantial equity volatility.
5
  
Financial market volatility in relation to politics is documented in the finance and 
economics literature. Pantzalis et al. (2000) find a positive abnormal return during the two-week 
period prior to the election week. Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2007) demonstrate that 
changing expectations about the winner of the 2004 presidential election moved equity prices. 
Several studies focus on the variance of abnormal returns over multiple election cycles. Using 
data from 27 OECD nations, Białkowski et al. (2008) find a pronounced increase in markets 
cumulative abnormal volatility (CAV) during the weeks around national elections. Boutchkova, 
Doshi, Durnev, and Molchanov (2012) examine industry effects of politics finding that industries 
show an asymmetric response to political events. However, since the industry assignments are 
made using SIC codes, there is no clearly defined defense industry effect in this sample. Goodell 
and Vähämaa (2013) study volatility around presidential elections and conclude that the 
presidential election process engenders market anxiety as investors form and revise their 
                                                 
 
5
 See Mayer (1990) for an expansive reference. 
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expectations regarding future macroeconomic policy.
6
 This collection of recent financial 
literature presents strong evidence that political uncertainty directly impacts equity volatility. 
From this evidence, one might conclude that politics incite a great deal of uneasiness among 
financial markets.
7
 
  
                                                 
 
6
 They construct empirical measures of political uncertainty and election uncertainty over five US presidential 
election cycles between 1992 and 2008. 
7
 Political shocks are exogenous and have the capacity to move financial markets. 
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Chapter 3: Hypotheses Development 
I present several hypotheses focused on the relationship between the political calendar 
and equity volatility. For each hypothesis, I presented the null and conduct two-way alternative 
testing. My first hypothesis tests the notion that military contractors face increased volatility in 
each election category. The second hypothesis tests the proposition that the election category 
helps explain the magnitude of the CAV. I compare various election categories including one 
based on the time period. Federal elections are sub-divided into two election types to test the 
prevailing view that presidential politics are more important than Congressional politics. I 
execute a time period analysis split by the September 11
th
, 2001 terror attacks to test for changes 
due to war and peace. If there is a direct link between political uncertainty and equity volatility 
of military contractors, this relationship may depend on war versus peace. The national security 
hypothesis suggests that military contractor’s equity volatility is amplified during periods of high 
uncertainty regarding national security and war policy. The final hypothesis uses the share of 
sales to the military as a proxy for political exposure to distinguish between two competing 
theories: regulatory capture and election risk. These hypotheses provide greater insight regarding 
the interaction between equity and political uncertainty. 
3.1. US Elections Increase Volatility (H1) 
The political uncertainty surrounding elections likely produces systematic changes to 
growth opportunities of military contractor firms in two dimensions. First, there is uncertainty 
associated with which political party will win the election. Since the winning party in each house 
of Congress selects the chairperson of each Congressional committee, the winning party has 
outsized influence in decision making. In Presidential elections, the influence is even more 
extreme as the commander-in-chief has tremendous direct influence over the military and the 
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power to nominate key leaders such as the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. Second, there is uncertainty about the differences between the parties in terms of 
national security and war policy. In some election years, the parties have similar priorities while 
others show substantial differences regarding military expenditures. The combination of these 
types of uncertainty dictates the systematic impact on expected growth opportunities of military 
contractor firms. 
From an idiosyncratic standpoint, the influence of individual politicians may help 
determine individual firms’ growth opportunities. Since individual politicians often directly 
lobby for military spending that benefits specific firms, they may play a substantial role in 
determining growth opportunities. Elections create uncertainty about which politicians will be in 
power, the committee assignments or political purview they enjoy, and their relationship to the 
majority party. Due to this, each election presents uncertainty for military contractors which may 
gain or lose valuable political connections. This individual political uncertainty translates to 
uncertainty about the set of growth opportunities faced by individual firms. This political 
uncertainty might be considered in terms of systematic and firm specific risk, with both types of 
risk substantially influencing equity volatility. 
Prior literature suggests a positive relationship between elections and volatility. Using an 
international sample of elections involving a head of state, Białkowski et al. (2008) finds strong 
evidence that the volatility of national equity markets increases in the days around elections. Is 
this volatility increase apparent in a sample of US military contractors? Is this increase present in 
all election categories: local, midterm, presidential, peace and war? The first hypothesis tests the 
notion that the political uncertainty associated with elections influences equity volatility. The 
null hypothesis of no cumulative abnormal volatility can be expressed as follows: 
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H1: CAVc (n1, n2) = 0 
This test can also provide an indication about the timing of a significant change in 
volatility. By adjusting the start date, n1, and the end date, n2, one can construct a variable CAV 
measurement. This is a useful tool to establish the timing of any change in volatility. An example 
of the (-40, 40) election window for these election categories is illustrated with the following: 
 
3.2. Election Categories Impact Volatility (H2) 
The second hypothesis tests the proposition that the magnitude of equity volatility in the 
months around elections is determined by the election category. Since most literature focuses on 
presidential elections, it is important to determine to what extent other election categories impact 
equity markets. The motivation suggests that political uncertainty around Federal elections 
directly impacts military contractor firms. Since local elections do not typically involve 
Congressional or presidential political uncertainty these provide an excellent control group. The 
sample alternates between federal and local election years which facilitate comparison of the 
groups due to the similar number of observations and minimal time period effects or mean 
differences between group characteristics. Additionally, all elections occur the same time of 
year, from November 2
nd
 through November 8
th
, always on Tuesdays, so no seasonal or day-of-
the-week adjustment is required. These characteristics allow for calculation of differences in 
CAV that are tested using the empirical distribution as determined by steps IV – VI of the 
bootstrap algorithm. Political uncertainty associated with federal elections is expected to amplify 
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the volatility of military contractors’ equity. The federal elections category CAV is tested against 
local elections category CAV as follows: 
H2a: CAV Federal - CAV Local = 0 
This approach is extended to test the prevailing view that presidential election years 
matter more than midterm election years. Since presidential elections years typically have greater 
popular emphasis, turnout, and higher political stakes than midterm elections, equity volatility of 
military contractors could also be magnified. Additionally, presidential elections years have 
more total uncertainty since they typically involve many appointed positions with great influence 
(i.e. Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.). Since these officials must 
be confirmed by Congress and there may be obstacles to that process, the equity volatility of 
military contractors may reflect that uncertainty. The presidential elections category CAV is 
tested against midterm elections category CAV as follows: 
H2b: CAV Presidential - CAV Midterm = 0 
Since the relationship between politics and military contractors is dynamic, the political 
environment during war likely alters the parameters. I create categories for war-time and peace-
time elections.
8
 I define the post-Cold War era as peaceful years from 1989 – 2000 and the 
Global War on Terror era of military conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other nations from 2001 - 
2012. Of course, the precipitating event is the terrorist attacks of September 11
th
 2001 which are 
associated with a large increase in uncertainty. These attacks produce the largest daily equity 
                                                 
 
8
 I thank Dr. Dorn for pointing out the difficulty of selling this definition. Alternative terms to frame this period 
based analysis may be pre-terror versus post-terror, elective military conflicts versus responsive military 
engagement. More investigation of appropriate political science terminology is required. 
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volatility for military contractors from 1988-2012.
9
 I examine the peace versus war election 
categories to determine if 9/11 shock and resulting war alters the equity volatility dynamics 
around elections. The sample is almost evenly divided by 9/11, facilitating a test of CAV 
differences for military contractors’ equity volatility. I test for this using elections conducted 
during a period of sustained peace, 1989-2000, against a period of sustained war, 2001-2012.
10
 
Do military contractors have different equity volatility around elections due to altered political 
risk dynamics depending on the US being at war or peace? This hypothesis is tested as follows: 
H2c: CAV War - CAV Peace = 0 
Political risk may be directly related to the freedom of politicians to decide military 
policy and therefore influence the growth opportunities of military contractors. Under this 
paradigm, a sole super-power at peace enjoys great discretion with regard to its military so 
political risk for military contractors could be high. Conversely, while at war, politicians are 
subject to additional constraints with regard to military spending, both systematic and firm-
specific. The military budget, firm characteristics, and operating performance data presented in 
the descriptive figures and tables, indicates that substantial changes occur as a result of conflict. 
Fundamental political and economic forces may influence equity volatility around elections, 
based on the condition of war. As such, it is possible that the 9/11 attacks are associated with a 
structural break in the relationship between political uncertainty and the equity volatility of 
military contractors. However, there may be a positive relationship between equity volatility and 
                                                 
 
9
 US financial markets reopened on September 17
th
, 2001. 
10
 These war vs. peace election categories are more vulnerable to criticism than the other election categories. The US 
was engaged in the Gulf War from August 2, 1990, through April 6, 1991, when Iraq officially accepted cease-fire 
terms. There were also a number of US military interventions for “peace keeping” mission from 1989-2000. During 
the war period, only the elections from 2003 – 2009 were held with US troops actively involved in Iraq. The most 
constant feature of the post-9/11 period is US involvement in Afghanistan. 
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military conflict due to the inherently unpredictable aspects of warfare. It is ultimately an 
empirical question that I answer using a test for CAV around elections. 
3.3. National Security Uncertainty Increases Volatility (H3) 
Uncertainty about US national security is likely to impact the equity volatility of military 
contractors. This uncertainty is focused around elections in two dimensions. The first involves 
the uncertainty about which candidates will win. When political races are competitive (lopsided), 
election results are more (less) uncertain, resulting in elevated (decreased) equity volatility. The 
second dimension concerns the differences between the opposing candidate positions. When 
partisan military budget and regulation priorities are very similar (different), elections produce a 
minimal (substantial) change in firms’ growth opportunities. For military contractors, the 
national security and war uncertainty index is a proxy for the joint interaction of 
competitiveness, priorities, and the national security environment. Changes to expected firm 
growth opportunities should translate to equity volatility via all three channels.  
While all assets have systematic and idiosyncratic risk components, some portion of these 
risks are channeled to military contractors in the form of political risk. The political process 
dictates the overall environment and the level of spending for military contractors. This can be 
viewed as a systematic political risk component, which is determined by factors such as the 
percentage of GDP spent on the military and the budget priorities for purchase of goods and 
services between air, ground, and naval forces. The idiosyncratic political risk component 
includes “pet projects” and other forms of winner picking by powerful politicians. Both 
components of political risk could have a material impact on firm performance. To the extent 
that major newspapers publish stories on these topics, uncertainty stemming from both 
components of political risk is reflected in the Baker et al. (2013) national security and war 
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uncertainty index. If elections do resolve some of the uncertainty about the risks facing military 
contractors, this should be reflected in the equity volatility. High uncertainty index elections 
CAV is tested against low uncertainty index elections CAV as follows: 
H3: CAV High Index - CAV Low Index = 0 
This hypothesis tests the notion that national security and war policy uncertainty in 
September helps to dictate military contractors’ equity volatility around elections. September is 
selected since it is the first month of the traditional campaign season. There is a trade-off here: 
September is close enough to the election to produce media focus on key election issues but is 
far enough ahead to allow for uncertainty about the results. This timing makes the index value in 
September an appropriate leading indicator of CAV through the event period.  
3.4. Share of Military Sales Determines Volatility (H4) 
Military contractor firms have a wide range of exposure to government purchasing and 
regulation. Some firms rely exclusively on sales to the military while others derive only a small 
portion of sales to the military. This sample includes military contractor firm-years with military 
sales ranging from ½% to 100% of overall sales. This range facilitates testing of two competing 
hypothesis regarding the share of sales to the military, the captured regulator hypothesis and the 
election risk hypothesis.  
As noted in the motivation section, military contractors are commonly viewed as 
capturing government policy makers, as with the “military industrial complex” speech. Under the 
captured regulatory hypothesis, military contractors with a high share of sales will capture (or 
even bribe) the winning politicians, regardless of the party or ideology of the winner.  
Consequently, military contractors exhibit no change in equity volatility around elections. 
Conversely, firms with a low share of sales to the military have less power to capture 
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politicians.
11
 These firms may gain or lose political connections based on the election results so 
they have elevated equity volatility around elections.  
In contrast to the captured regulator hypothesis, political leaders may drastically 
influence the prospects of military contractors. Under the election risk hypothesis, military 
contractors with a high share of sales are the most exposed to both systematic and idiosyncratic 
political risk so exhibit greater volatility around elections. Conversely, under the election risk 
hypothesis, firms with a low share of sales have less reliance on military sales so exhibit lower 
volatility around elections. To test this hypothesis, I find the differences in CAV between the top 
and bottom quartiles of firms based on the share of sales to the military: 
H4: CAV High Share - CAV Low Share = 0 
3.5. Daily Volatility Is Non-Linear Around Elections (H5) 
Do elections produce non-constant daily volatility for military contractor firms? If 
political uncertainty does drive equity volatility, we should observe increasing daily volatility 
pre-election, a substantial decline in daily volatility at the election, and non-positive volatility 
post-election. This hypothesis tests key values to illustrate how a daily equity volatility profile 
among military contractors is associated with political uncertainty around election categories. 
Using the simple volatility model (9), the seven volatility profile parameters shown in figure 4 
can be tested. These include four time point measures of volatility, the volatility change on 
Election Day, and two time trend measures of volatility. The presence of abnormal fitted 
volatility on a day, t, is tested as follows: 
                                                 
 
11
 Dr. Dorn points out that it is not only the company’s share of government sales that matter. The importance of a 
military contractor in individual politician’s districts could substantially influence political decisions. While 
obtaining the data to investigate this is challenging the idea is interesting.  
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H5a:   ̂        
This test shows differences between the baseline level of volatility and actual daily 
volatility during the event window. I test for abnormal volatility at each of the four daily points 
illustrated in figure 4. Note that if the daily volatility measures at the beginning (n1 = -40) and 
ending (n2 = 40) points do not show abnormal volatility, the event window duration is sufficient 
to encapsulate a volatility profile. Also, since there are two points on the election date, we can 
observe the election date fitted volatility based on pre or post-election data. One might think of 
these values as the expected level of daily volatility before and after election results are released, 
respectively. This election date change in fitted daily volatility indicates how much daily 
volatility is resolved by each election category. The change in fitted volatility is tested as 
follows:  
H5b:   ̂      
An insignificant value would indicate that elections do not directly impact the equity 
volatility of military contractors. A negative value is consistent with the idea that election results 
do resolve political uncertainty.  
The last two sub-hypotheses tests are designed to indicate changing daily volatility in the 
months before and after elections. The daily increase in pre-election fitted volatility is tested as 
follows: 
H5c:          
An insignificant slope indicates that daily equity volatility is not a function of the days 
until the election date. A positive slope is consistent with the idea that daily volatility increases 
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over the weeks prior to elections. The daily increase in post-election fitted volatility is tested as 
follows: 
H5d:           
The H5d test indicates if fitted daily volatility is a function of the time following the 
election date. An insignificant slope indicates that daily equity volatility is not a function of the 
days since the election date. A negative slope is consistent with the idea that daily volatility 
diminishes in the weeks following the election date. 
If political risk drives equity volatility and elections are associated with a dynamic 
revision of political risk, equity volatility will be non-constant over the event period. 
Specifically, if firms are politically sensitive, equity volatility should increase prior to the 
election, diminish sharply when election results are revealed, and then display a non-positive 
volatility time trend following the election.
12
 
  
                                                 
 
12
 These three key profile parameters could be referenced as the volatility election profile parameters (VEPP).  
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
The primary focus of this research is to quantify the impact of the electoral calendar on 
equity volatility. This is ultimately an empirical question which can be tested using a response to 
the exogenous political shocks associated with elections. The foundation of this approach is the 
Bollerslev (1986) GARCH (1, 1) model, which facilitates measurement of conditional equity 
volatility. My approach extends the methodology detailed by Białkowski et al. (2008) to capture 
firm-level volatility. Ultimately, this methodology allows testing hypotheses leading to the 
central research question; “How does political uncertainty impact equity volatility?” 
The methodology section explains how I construct the equity volatility measures. Since 
cross correlation of abnormal returns can produce badly skewed test statistics (Kolari and 
Pynnönen (2010)), I checked for average correlation of abnormal moments to help identify the 
appropriate methodology. The evidence shown in figures 2 and 3 indicates 6.8% mean abnormal 
returns and mean 6.3% abnormal volatility, with several years showing greatly elevated 
correlation. The September 11
th
, 2001 terror attacks produce extremely high correlation of 
unconditional volatilility with a mean value of 39.5% in 2001. Due to the substantial cross 
sectional correlation, the Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991), Brown and Warner (1980), 
and the Patell (1976) t-test statistics are invalid. Savickas (2003) finds that the GARCH-based 
test presents a superior alternative given evidence of correlation in both the first and second 
moments. My extension of the Białkowski et al. (2008) methodology produces firm-level 
volatility measures that are robust to the challenges presented by cross sectional correlation. 
 [ Figures 2 & 3 about here] 
I examine the period around US elections due to their consistent rules, predictable timing, 
and exogenous shock to the set of political decision-makers. My selection of a (-40, 40) event 
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window is based on the US political calendar as it covers the period of elevated political 
uncertainty surrounding elections. Forty trading days equates to about two months in calendar 
days. My event period begins in early September, close to Labor Day. Major-party Presidential 
campaigns traditionally begin on Labor Day (Pearson (2013)) and, therefore, last approximately 
two months. My event period ends in early January, close to the beginning of a new session of 
Congress. This four month window covers the period of changing expectations due to 
campaigning and aftermath of the elections before the new set of political decision-makers are 
sworn into office. In contrast to the international election study by Białkowski et al. (2008) with 
elections held with shorter notice and at different times of the year, my sample employs only US 
elections so the political calendar is a constant.  
4.1. GARCH (1, 1) Conditional Volatility Measures 
The volatility methodology follows the approach detailed by Białkowski et al. (2008). 
Consistent with their estimation and event periods, 500 daily returns in the estimation period are 
used, starting at trading day -540 and ending at trading day -41 relative to the election date. To 
ensure each year has a full-rank matrix for the GARCH model, I require the full 500-day 
estimation window for each firm.
13
 The firm-election specific component of variance is isolated 
using the following GARCH (1, 1) model:  
 (1) 
 (2)  
                                                 
 
13
 The 250-day estimation period of Brown and Warner (1985) may be insufficient to produce well-specified 
GARCH (1,1) parameters. Guided by extant work, I select a 500-day estimation period. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ,𝑦 = ∝𝑖 ,𝑦+  𝑖,𝑦𝑅𝑚 ,𝑡 ,𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡 ,𝑦  ,       𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,𝑦~𝑁 0,ℎ𝑖 ,𝑡 ,𝑦  
ℎ𝑖 ,𝑡 ,𝑦 = 𝛾0,𝑦 + 𝛾1,𝑦ℎ𝑖 ,𝑡 1,𝑦 + 𝛾2,𝑦𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡 1,𝑦
2
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where 𝑅       and 𝑅      are the daily stock returns on firm i at day t for election year y and the 
value weighted US market return on day t for year y, respectively. 𝜀      is the residual 
idiosyncratic firm-specific component of returns, while ℎ      represents conditional variance. 
The residual term, 𝜀     , is typically referred to as an abnormal return in the finance literature and 
is referenced as such from this point on. The maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) jointly 
generates the parameters for (1) and (2) over the estimation period. 
Measurement of abnormal volatility requires that variation in 𝜀     around the event date 
is considered relative to non-event levels. A single adjustment is required for (1) to eliminate the 
idiosyncratic component of returns. The parameter      is included during the estimation period, 
but only the systematic component of returns can be predicted so      is set to zero during the 
event period. In other words, the idiosyncratic component of returns is accounted for during the 
estimation period but is not applied to the event period.  
The GARCH (1, 1) model is employed to indicate what the conditional variance would 
have been, without an election.
14
 However, the election dates are known years ahead of time. 
The one-day-ahead forecast of (2) will obviously not produce an event-independent result. This 
issue is resolved by conditionalizing the volatility forecast on the information set available well 
before the event.
15
 The volatility benchmark for the k-th day of the event window is defined as a 
k-step- ahead forecast of the conditional variance based on the information set available on the 
                                                 
 
14
 Selection of the GARCH (1, 1) model presents some potential specification problems for the conditional variance 
of individual firms. While each the abnormal returns and conditional variance of each firm could be individually 
specified using a GARCH (p, q) model, this significantly complicates the analysis and breaks with the well 
established practice of employing GARCH (1, 1) to model equity returns. 
15
 The selection of an estimation period ending 41 trading days before each election is arbitrary to some extent  as 
there is no clear beginning or end to the election cycle. As noted earlier in the paper, I selected the end of the 
estimation period to coincide with the traditional kick-off to campaigning season, Labor Day Weekend.  
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last day of the estimation window t*. The volatility benchmark is defined as a forecast of 
conditional variance using the information available on the final day of the estimation window, 
namely ℎ       and 𝜀      
 :  
  (3) 
where      is a full-rank matrix for each year included in the sample. This full-rank 
requirement ensures that estimation quality remains constant across firms, i, and years, y. The 
values for  
, ,
ˆ
x i y  are parameters determined during the estimation period. The event period 
distribution of residuals is described by 𝜀       𝑁  𝑅              [ℎ           ]   where  𝑅      is 
the event-induced abnormal return,     is the multiplicative effect of the event on volatility, and 
t > t*.
16
 Under a null hypothesis that elections do not alter volatility, the value of      is one. 
However, under the assumption of residual orthogonality, the residual variance would be:   
 (4) 
                                                 
 
16
 If residuals were demeaned using the cross-section average, they would be normally distributed with zero mean. 
 [ℎ𝑖 ,𝑡 +𝑘 ,𝑦 | 𝑡 ,𝑦 ] = 𝛾 0   𝛾 1 + 𝛾 2 
𝑗
𝑘 1
𝑗=0
+  𝛾 1ℎ𝑖 ,𝑡 +𝑘 ,𝑦 + 𝛾 2𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡 +𝑘 ,𝑦
2   𝛾 1 + 𝛾 2 
𝑘 1  
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where EIDRVi,t,y is the event-independent demeaned residual variance and Ny is the number of 
firms included in the sample each year, y. At the firm-election level, volatility is modeled as 
follows:  
 (5) 
where 𝜀 ̂     𝑅       ̂    𝑅      and 𝑡  𝑡
 . Under a null hypothesis of no change in volatility 
due to elections, the demeaned standardized residuals follow a normal distribution because        
equals one. Since the research intent is to quantify the effect of United States elections on equity 
volatility, Mt is the primary test parameter.
17
 Election categories, c, are defined by type or time 
period using years, y, to produce multiplicative event volatility,  ̂t,c, for each category of 
elections. A category of election-observations can be defined using any unique characteristic. 
Consequently, this firm-level analysis produces the multiplicative effect on volatility by event 
category:
18
 
 (6) 
where Yc is the number of years for an election category, c, and Ny is the number of firms 
included in the sample each year, y. 
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 See Boehmer et al. (1991) and Hilliard and Savickas (2002) for the basis of this approach. 
18
 This volatility measure could be referenced as the MEVEC. 
  𝑖 ,𝑡 ,𝑦 =  𝑁𝑦  𝜀?̂? ,𝑡,𝑦   𝜀?̂? ,𝑡 ,𝑦
𝑁𝑦
𝑗=1
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 𝑁𝑦
2   𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑉𝑖,𝑡 ,𝑦 
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𝑖=1
𝑌𝑐
𝑦=1
   𝑁𝑦
𝑌𝑐
𝑦=1
 1  
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4.2. Cumulative Abnormal Volatility (CAV) 
If elections do not impact volatility, the demeaned standardized residuals follow a 
standard normal distribution because      equals one. Therefore, abnormal changes in volatility 
on any day t during the event window (n1, n2) are given by ( ̂t,c – 1). The cumulative abnormal 
volatility (CAV) for any election category, c, can be calculated as follows: 
  (7) 
where n1 is the beginning day of the event and n2 is the concluding day of the event. The election 
category CAV is therefore the sum of excess daily volatility from day n1 through day n2. Under 
the assumption of no cross correlation of abnormal returns, the test statistic for CAVc is: 
 (8) 
However, figure 2 presents clear evidence that this assumption does not hold. As such, I 
bootstrap the distribution of returns to produce a valid test statistic.  
4.2.1. Bootstrap Algorithm 
The soundness of the results of the theoretical tests hinge on the assumptions of the 
econometric model. Non-normality, cross-sectional dependence, or autocorrelation of the 
regression residuals, 𝜀      are all potentially complicating factors. These issues are circumvented 
using the Efron (1979) bootstrapping methodology to define statistical significance. Event period 
CAV for various election categories are compared to the empirical distribution of CAV during 
𝐶 𝑉𝑐 𝑛1,𝑛2 =  Mˆ 𝑡 ,𝑐
𝑛2
𝑡=𝑛1
   𝑛2  𝑛1 + 1  

𝑐
 𝑛1,𝑛2 =   𝑁𝑦
𝑌𝑐
𝑦=1
 1  Mˆ 𝑡 ,𝑐
𝑛2
𝑡=𝑛1
  ~ 
  𝑁𝑦
𝑌𝑐
𝑦=1  1  𝑛2 𝑛1+1 
2  
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the whole sample period, as simulated under the null hypothesis.
19
 When the difference between 
CAV for various election categories is calculated, the results follow a different distribution than 
the original. The following algorithm generates both of these empirical distributions: 
I) Randomly draw (n2 - n1 + 1) estimation period M values with replacement. 
II) Compute the CAV using equation (7) for the randomly generated sample over the (n2 
- n1 + 1) day long window. 
III) Repeat steps I and II 10,000 times. Sort the collection of resulting CAVs in ascending 
order to obtain the empirical distribution. The bootstrapped p-value is defined as the 
number of bootstrapped CAVs that exceed the CAV calculated for the original 
election sample, divided by the number of replications (i.e. 10,000).  
IV) Randomly divide the CAV results from step III into two equal groups. 
V) Compute CAV1 – CAV2 for each of the 5000 pairs.  
VI) Sort the collection of resulting differences in ascending order to obtain the empirical 
distribution. The bootstrapped p-value is defined as the number of bootstrapped 
differences that exceed the differences calculated for the various election categories 
in the original sample, divided by the number of replications (i.e. 5,000).  
4.2.2. Daily Volatility Modeling 
I construct a parsimonious model of daily equity volatility to illustrate the relationship 
between political uncertainty and equity volatility around elections. The election date is defined 
as event day zero. However, since markets close in the afternoon while US election results are 
not made public until evening, the pre-election period contains day zero. I run segmented 
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 This requires a calculation of the daily volatility (Mt) for each of the 24*250 = 6000 days in the sample.  
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regressions on the daily multiplicative effect of volatility to produce fitted volatility models. The 
fitted volatility model
20
 is stated as a piecewise function: 
  (9) 
where α terms are volatility intercepts at the beginning of the event period, n1, and on the 
election date, T0, respectively. The β terms allow non-constant volatility both pre and post-
election. t is the number of days relative to the election date and et represents the error term in 
the regression. I model the 41 day period (-40, 0) as pre-election results and the 40 day period (1, 
40) as the post-election results period. This simple model of fitted volatility facilitates testing of 
seven volatility parameters as shown in figure 4.  
[ Figure 4 about here] 
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 As suggested by Dr. Wada, an alternate model can be stated in a single equation using time dependant dummy 
variables. This alternate model facilitates the econometric tests but is more difficult to code in SAS. This alternate 
specification will be investigated further following the dissertation defense. 
  𝑡 ,𝑐 =   𝑇0<𝑡+ 𝑇0<𝑡  𝑡  + е𝑡
 𝑡≤𝑇0 + 𝑡≤𝑇0𝑡  + е𝑡
,       𝑇0<𝑡  ≤𝑛2
,       𝑛1≤𝑡≤𝑇0
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Chapter 5: Data 
Several disparate data sources are leveraged for this research. The primary source is the 
SIPRI database on arms-producing and military services companies, which provides the list of 
military contractors. This data set is used to identify US public firms with large military 
contracts. The SIPRI data is augmented with financial information extracted from both CRSP 
and Compustat. Baker et al. (2013) provide an index for national security and war uncertainty. 
Election dates are always the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, as required by 
law. The US Senate maintains a list of these election dates. Table I lists the variables and 
acronyms in this paper. Some of these are extracted from other sources and use the terminology 
of the original reference to the extent possible. The data from each source is explained in more 
detail throughout this section. 
[ Table I about here] 
5.1. US Public Military Contractor Firms 
The “defense industry” is difficult to define as military contractors span a wide range of 
SIC codes. Military contractors vary greatly in their percentage of sales to the military, both by 
time and firm. To better define the industry, I use the SIPRI database of arms-producing and 
military services companies from 1989 through 2012 to identify US public military contractor 
firms (SIPRI (2013)).
21
 Moving beyond mere identification, SIPRI estimates a key variable for 
measuring the military focus of each firm: the percentage of firm reveunue derived from sales to 
the military, share. Arms sales are defined by SIPRI as sales of military goods and services to 
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 Many thanks to Dr. Sam Perlo-Freeman for extracting this data from the SIPRI archival database. This SIPRI 
dataset includes unpublished information since only the Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies in 
the world are included in the SIPRI yearbook.  
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military customers, including both sales for domestic procurement and sales for export. Military 
goods and services are those that are designed specifically for military purposes and the 
technologies related to such goods and services.
22
 The filters for inclusion in the sample require 
that each firm-year observation meets the following:  
I) US headquartered firm included in the annual SIPRI database among the Top 300 
arms-producing and military services companies in the world. This must include the 
SIPRI variable, sharei,y  (arms sales over total firm sales). (1494 observations) 
II) Public firm with Compustat data and common equity (CEQ) greater than zero. (1238 
observations) 
III) Complete CRSP record of daily stock prices over a 600 trading day window (-550, 
50). (1165 observations) 
International firms are not included as they may be less directly impacted by political 
shocks in the United States. Subsidiaries, non-profits, and private firms are eliminated from 
consideration due to the lack of available data.  
Table II presents a comprehensive list of the 121 US public military contractor firms 
including their industry categories. One striking result is that only 7.1% of these military 
contractor firm-year observations belong to the Fama-French 48 industry group “Defense”. As 
extreme examples, two firms that derive 100% of their revenues from sales to the military, 
United Defense Industries and Force Protection, Inc., belong to the industry group “Automobiles 
and Trucks” rather than “Defense”. To my knowledge, my sample of military contractor firms, 
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 The SIPRI definition of arms sales serves as a guideline; application of these principles requires judgment. SIPRI 
provides a comprehensive explanation of the definitions and methodology on their website. 
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derived from the SIPRI database, is the more accurate and comprehensive collection of publicly 
traded US military contractor firms employed in academic research.  
[ Table II about here] 
5.2. National Security and War Uncertainty 
A component of the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index developed by Baker, Bloom, and 
Davis (2013) measures uncertainty related to national security.
23
 They construct an uncertainty 
index based on keyword search results from 10 large newspapers using month-by-month 
searches. The newspapers included in the index are: USA Today, the Miami Herald, the Chicago 
Tribune, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the Boston Globe, the San Francisco 
Chronicle, the Dallas Morning News, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal. They 
require that articles contain the term ‘uncertainty’ or ‘uncertain’, the terms ‘economic’ or 
‘economy’ and one or more of the following terms: ‘congress’, ‘deficit’, ‘federal reserve’, 
‘legislation’, ‘regulation’ or ‘white house’ (or related terms like ‘regulatory’ or ‘the fed’). To 
meet the criteria for inclusion the article must include terms in all three categories pertaining to 
uncertainty, the economy, and policy with the goal being to select articles in US news sources 
that discuss something about uncertainty over economic policy. The overall index contains a sub-
index regarding news coverage about policy-related economic uncertainty.  
They count the number of articles that satisfy the search criteria each month, giving a 
monthly series for each paper. From these papers, Baker et al. (2013) create a normalized index 
of the volume of news articles discussing economic policy uncertainty. They apply a second 
                                                 
 
23
 This national security and war uncertainty data is summarized in table II of the working paper. It is not yet 
published on their excellent website www.policyuncertainty.com This data covers 1985 to 2012 and was generously 
shared via email by the authors.   
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filter to create the national security and war uncertainty index when the article contains one or 
more of the following terms: ”national security”, “war”, “military conflict”, “terrorism”, “terror”, 
“9/11”, “defense spending”, “military spending”, “police action”, “armed forces”, “base 
closure”, “military procurement”, “saber rattling”, “naval blockade”, “military embargo”, “no-fly 
zone”, “military invasion”. The result is a monthly index that proxies for the degree of political 
uncertainty which military contractors face. 
I use the national security & war uncertainty data monthly data beginning in January 
1989. It is presented in figure 5 with the raw index value normalized to 100. As one might 
expect, periods of great national security and war uncertainty produce large spikes. Each of the 
three most uncertain months coincides with the beginning of a war: Operation Desert Storm, 
January 1991; the Al-Qaeda Terror Attacks, September 2001; and Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
March 2003. There are also smaller spikes that often occur in the months prior to federal 
elections. Some examples of this include the Clinton win in 1992, the Obama win in 2008 and 
the GOP takeover of the House of Representatives in 2010. The index values presented in figure 
5 are analyzed to produce the data presented in Table III. 
[ Figure 5 about here] 
Table III presents monthly national security & war uncertainty from January 1985 
through October 2012. Policy is the overall economic policy uncertainty index value. News-
based is the uncertainty component from newspapers, and it comprises 50% of the overall 
economic policy uncertainty index. National Security is the uncertainty component from 
newspapers that deals with security and war. All t-stats are calculated using the Satterthwaite 
method for unequal variances. 
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Table III, Panel A presents uncertainty metrics by periods in order to show how 
uncertainty changes. There is a stark contrast between all metrics separated by the events of 
September 11
th
, 2001 that suggests a major shift in US emphasis on national security and war 
uncertainty. For policy, news, and national security based uncertainty, there is a large and long-
lasting increase in uncertainty associated with 9/11, significant at 1%. This may mean that the 
shift in national security and war uncertainty propagated throughout the national debate and 
impacted all types of economic uncertainty. These findings are consistent with the idea that the 
9/11 terrorist attacks increased media emphasis regarding national security and war. 
In addition to the terrorist attacks, I check for the effect of the more existential threat of 
global catastrophe as measured by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. They keep the 
Doomsday Clock, which uses the number of minutes to midnight as an indicator of the 
probability of a global catastrophic event. When introduced, the initial setting was seven minutes 
to midnight; since the sample is well divided by this setting, seven minutes serves as the break 
point. From 1985 through 1989 and again beginning in 2002, the Doomsday Clock was set at 
seven minutes or less to midnight. While overall economic uncertainty is significantly different, I 
do not ascribe a reason for the difference, since no significance is found in national security and 
war uncertainty. As such, the proxy for risk of global catastrophe did not significantly alter the 
uncertainty reported by newspapers. 
[ Table III about here] 
Table III, Panel B presents the differences between years (even) with a US federal 
election and years (odd) without federal elections. The six highest and six lowest values of the 
national security and war index were dropped to produce the 2% truncated values. From highest 
to lowest, the high value truncated months are: January 1991 – Operation Desert Storm; March 
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2003 – Invasion of Iraq; September 2001 – 9/11 Terrorist Attacks; February 2003 – Build-up to 
the Invasion of Iraq; November 2001 – Response to 9/11 and Operations in Afghanistan; and 
January 2003 – Build-up to the invasion of Iraq. From lowest to highest, the low value truncated 
months are October 2009, July 2000, February 2000, September 1997, October 1997, and August 
2001. It is difficult to ascribe reasons for these observations as low values are due to the absence 
of focus on national security and war events. These findings are consistent with the proposition 
that the national media focus shifts more heavily towards uncertainty regarding national security 
and war in the months leading up to a US federal election. 
The US political uncertainty index shows a distinct election year pattern. National 
security and war uncertainty index is 33% amplified in August through November of US federal 
election years compared to local election years. This difference is significant at the 5% level and 
most likely reflects the increased debate regarding military defense policy associated with 
political campaigns for US federal elections. When the data is truncated at 2% to remove 
confounding events, the difference is significant at the 1% level. This is strong evidence that 
public discourse focuses on the relationship between political uncertainty surrounding US federal 
elections and uncertainty about the military.  
Table III, Panel C details differences between midterm elections and presidential 
elections. While prior academic research has heavily focused on presidential politics, these 
findings show that national security and war debate around presidential elections is not 
significantly greater than the debate around midterm elections. This absence of a significant 
difference between presidential and midterm elections suggest that both executive and legislative 
channels are important factors influencing the national security and war debate. 
  
38 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Results 
This section presents the major results of this research in three sub-sections. The 
descriptive results provide summary and descriptive information about the data. Descriptive 
results help to define the data but contribute only indirectly to the conclusions of this research. 
The hypotheses results present evidence to support the five hypothesis tests which leads directly 
to the conclusions. The robustness results provide additional evidence to reinforce the findings of 
the hypotheses results. The robustness section details additional testing to reinforce the veracity 
of the main conclusions. Collectively, the results presented in these three sub-sections answer the 
central question of this research; how does political uncertainty impact equity volatility? 
6.1. Descriptive Results 
The descriptive results include operating performance, model specification, and CAV 
critical value information. Descriptive statistics and operating performance metrics are presented 
to provide an overview of the business environment of military contractors. GARCH (1, 1) 
model results are shown to demonstrate that my methodology adequately models conditional 
variance. The CAV critical values are presented to clarify how my bootstrapping procedure 
yields valid test statistics. 
6.1.1.  Descriptive and Operating Performance Measures 
The descriptive statistics in Table IV provide characteristics of military contractors and 
operating performance measures. My sample of US public military contractor firms are typically 
larger than the average international arms-producing and military services companies with a 
mean (median) rank of 82.6 (77). The mean (median) US firm derives 40.5% (35.0%) of total 
sales from arms since smaller firms are more likely to be specialized military contractors. The 
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military contractors firms are generally profitable with a mean (median) ROE of 16.2% (12.4%) 
and ROA of 4.2% (4.9%).
24
 More than 80% of firm-year observations have positive values for 
all operating performance variables. These results are consistent with the notion that US military 
contractors are powerful and profitable firms.  
[ Table IV about here] 
There is substantial variability of the various metrics from 1989 through 2012 so plots are 
included to depict the shifting performance of the military contractor industry. Figure 6 shows 
that operating performance measures exhibit time dependent variability that is consistent with 
US federal government military spending patterns. Ratios are depressed during the period of 
military draw downs (1991-94) following the end of the Cold War. The operating performance 
ratios show a smaller decline in 2000 with a rebound again following military budget increases 
associated with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These results demonstrate a linkage between the 
operating performance of military contractors and the changes in US Federal Government 
spending due to the status of military conflicts. 
[ Figure 6 about here]. 
Growth opportunities of military contractor firms are tied to US military posture. Figure 7 
presents the sample mean market to book ratio as the simple Tobin’s Q and the more complex 
Tobin’s Q provided by Chung and Pruitt (1994). The mean market to book ratio of sample firms 
shows a large degree of variability ranging from 0.43 at the end of the Cold War to 1.34 during 
the Global War on Terror. While the military contractors exhibit Tobin’s Q values that are 
similar to the overall market, they did appear to underperform during the dot.com bubble (1997-
                                                 
 
24
 The extreme outliers for ROE are: -604% for Morrison Knudsen in 1994 and 7038% for Lockheed Martin in 
2012. 
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2000) and outperform for the Global War on Terror years following the attacks of September 
11
th
, 2001. This evidence suggests a link between the political environment and the growth 
opportunities of military contractors, generally consistent with the findings of Goyal et al. 
(2002). This link between US foreign policy regarding military conflict and the growth 
opportunities of the domestic military contractor industry is not surprising. 
[ Figure 7 about here] 
Figure 8 shows that military contractor characteristics also shift over the sample period. 
The mean share of sales to the military is 36.7% before the terror attacks of 9/11 and 43.8% after 
the attacks. This indicates that US military contractors may be more specialized arms-producing 
and military services companies in the later years of the sample. The mean global ranking of US 
military contractors based on the SIPRI definition of arms-producing and military services 
companies increased from a low ranking of 106
th
 in 1995 to a high of 63
th
 in 2011. This indicates 
that the average size of US military contractors relative to foreign military contractors is time 
dependent. In connection with H2c, this growth after 9/11 suggests that war may alter the 
characteristics of contractors.  
[ Figure 8 about here] 
Figure 9 presents the number of firms in the sample each year and provides the annual 
industry diversity of military contractors. The list of military contractors ranges from 40 to 61 
firms in any given year, exhibiting a generally stationary trend. The diversity of industries in the 
sample ranges from 12 to 18 Fama French industry groups or 21 to 32 SIC codes. Again, the 
diversity of industries appears to exhibit stationarity. The stationarity of the data suggests that 
comparison between years without adjustments is valid. 
[ Figure 9 about here] 
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6.1.2.  GARCH (1, 1) Model Parameters 
The GARCH (1, 1) model parameters presented in Table V provide key indications of the 
nature of military contractors’ equity volatility. In each of the 1165 firm-year observations, 500 
trading days were used in the estimation period so there is overlap year-on-year. Panel A shows 
the estimation period parameters used to calculate the event period abnormal returns and 
conditional volatility. The mean (median) α = 0.03%  (0.03%), with both the t-test and Wilcoxon 
test significant at the 1% level, indicating that these military contractor firms outperformed the 
market over the 24-year sample period. However, the economic significance of this excess return 
is marginal. Additionally, with a mean (median) β = 0.93 (0.92), these firms typically exhibit 
below-average systematic risk, with both the t-test and Wilcoxon test significant at the 1% level. 
This low β suggests that military contractors are typically less volatility than the overall market. 
The relative stability of military contracts is likely the reason for this dampened equity volatility. 
Both of these parameter values for abnormal returns from (1) are plausible given the nature of 
the sample.  
The volatility parameters from (2) also produce sensible values. The parameter γ0 = 
0.00018 defines the mean level of minimum volatility, while γ1 indicates that 45% of conditional 
variance is carried over from the prior day. The parameter γ2 indicates that 18% of conditional 
variance is comprised of the mean lagged unconditional variance. Taken together, these three 
parameters indicate that most firm-years are well modeled using GARCH (1, 1). However, some 
firm-years have γ1 or γ2 values that approach unity or zero. In these cases the GARCH (1,1) 
model collapses to a moving average (MA) or auto-regressive (AR) model. Ultimately, the 
parameters show that the GARCH (1,1) model adequately fits the equity volatility of this sample 
of military contractors. 
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[ Table V about here] 
As suggested by the non-constant annual operating performance, it is clear that military 
contractors’ model parameters also change substantially from 1989 through 2012. Figure 10 
presents annual α and β values from (1). The α > 0.1% values are noticeably elevated in the first 
years of the George W. Bush presidency, indicating that military contractors outperformed the 
market. However, even the best estimation period year (2002) for military contractors, while 
significant at 1%, only resulted in market outperformance of 0.185%. The beta of military 
contractors ranges from a low of 0.54 in 2000 to a high of 1.23 in 2006 but is generally higher in 
the post-9/11 period. This demonstrates that both operating performance and the parameters for 
abnormal returns varied over the sample period. 
[ Figure 10 about here] 
Figure 11 presents the mean γ0 parameter used to establish the minimum conditional 
variance in the GARCH (1, 1) model. An interesting feature of this figure is the γ0 > 0.0003 
elevated mean minimum volatility during the first years of the George W. Bush presidency. This 
may suggest an elevated level of uncertainty about the future of military contractor firms, 
coincident with the highest α values. This is suggestive of a stable ex post Sharpe Ratio.25 The 
minimum variance parameter appears stationary and exhibits plausible values.  
[ Figures 11 about here] 
Figure 12 presents the mean parameters for γ1 and γ2 for conditional variance in the 
GARCH (1, 1) model. Both parameters exhibit properties of stationarity and yield plausible 
values. 
                                                 
 
25
 Of course, the minimum variance is only part of the story. Nevertheless, a quasi-Sharpe Ratio constructed using α 
and the minimum σ of the military contractors could be instructive. 
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[ Figure 12 about here] 
I display event period values from (1), (2), and (5) in Table V, Panel B. The mean 
(median) event period abnormal return, ε = 0.03% (-0.03%), with both the t-test and Wilcoxon 
test significant at 1%, showing that the mean (median) firm continues to outperform 
(underperform) the market during the event period. Again the economic significance of these 
results is negligible. The daily firm-level conditional volatility, h, and the normalized volatility 
measure, Q, both show strong positive skewness consistent with a chi-squared distribution. Since 
the Q is the basis of the volatility measures in this research, subsequent tables will explain it in 
greater depth. Taken together, these parameters provide strong evidence that the GARCH (1, 1) 
model is appropriate for this sample. 
6.1.3.  Bootstrapped CAV Critical Values 
Figure 13 reports the results of the CAV critical values based on 10,000 bootstrapped 
trials as explained in the methodology section. This figure presents the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-
way confidence intervals for the CAV critical values. Clearly, the bootstrapped distribution 
deviates from a normal distribution. The substantial differences stem from cross-sectional 
correlation of abnormal returns as identified in figure 2. The most obvious feature of figure 13 is 
the extreme increase in 1% critical values shortly before the election. A brief investigation 
determined that a single trading day was responsible for this unusual feature. Perhaps one should 
not be surprised to find that the first trading day after 9/11 produced extreme volatility among 
military contractors. September 17
th
, 2001 is to blame: what a difference a day makes.  
[ Figure 13 about here] 
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Due to the unique nature and extreme impact of this day, I truncated September 17
th
, 
2001 from the data used to produce the bootstrapped distribution.
26
 In doing so, I make the 
implicit assumption that a similar event will not occur. To this extent, the statistics I report are –
like many statistics – not robust to Black Swan Theory as explained by Taleb (2007). While this 
was only one of 6000 data dates, the resulting critical values shown in figure 14 are substantially 
altered. However, even with this adjustment, this figure presents critical values that remain non-
normal, with a noticably skewed distribution.
27
 The p-value tests for all election category CAV is 
based on the results presented in figure 14. The modified distribution is therefore a more 
reasonable representation of the expectation for future CAV. 
[ Figure 14 about here] 
The non-normal distribution of CAV results in a new distribution for  the differences 
between CAV. Since these differences in CAV between election categories do not follow the 
same empirical distribution, I calculate those following the bootstrap algorithm. The critical 
values for the CAV differences are presented in figure 15. As theory suggests, the critical values 
of this bootstrapped distribution are nearly symmetric, more consistent with a normal 
distribution. The critical values presented in this distribution are used to determine the 
significance of p-values in the CAV differences tables. 
[ Figure 15 about here] 
                                                 
 
26
 For the results that exclude September 17
th
, 2001, the extreme volatility measure on that date is truncated. On that 
day, the value weighted market return was -5.1%, while 10% of the sample firms enjoyed returns greater than 34%, 
producing extremely high abnormal returns. Since this date is 36 trading days prior to the election, the category 
volatility is formally stated: M-36,2001  = 54. This value indicates a volatility level that is 5300% above the benchmark 
volatility. For perspective, the second most extreme volatility date, M-17,2008 = 18. 
27
 As suggested by Dr. Kim, the skewness must be rigorously quantified. Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian (2009) may 
provide a good resource for this. 
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6.2. Hypotheses Tests  
The results of the hypotheses tests provide a detailed account of the relationship between 
political uncertainty and equity volatility. The H1 test results show evidence of amplified CAV 
around elections, consistent with the findings of Białkowski et al. (2008). The H2a test results 
demonstrate that federal elections increase the equity volatility of military contractors’ more than 
local elections. To test H2b, federal elections are sub-divided into presidential and midterm 
elections, then compared to show that these categories exhibit distinct volatility patterns. The H2c 
results suggest that the period of war following the September 11
th
, 2001 terror attacks changes 
the relationship between political uncertainty and equity volatility. The H3 results show that 
military contractors’ equity volatility exhibits a strong positive relationship with national security 
and war uncertainty. From the H4 results, I find only weak and inconsistent evidence that 
powerful military contractors engage in regulatory capture, mitigating their equity volatility 
around elections. As such, the H4 results are inconclusive. Finally, the H5 test results show a 
distinct daily volatility profile around elections. The volatility profile models I construct help to 
explain the dynamic interaction between political risk around elections and equity volatility. My 
research extends the finance literature by explaining how political risk determines a large portion 
of equity volatility in the weeks before and after US elections.  
To better convey the volatility dynamics around elections, I include CAV figures to 
illustrate the results presented in the tables. Since CAV can be determined for any election 
category – including individual years – these annual volatility results are shown in figures 16 & 
17. However, some of these annual results are explained by confounding events, so caution is 
required when attempting to interpret the annual CAV without considering the historical context. 
These figures are a useful reference but individual years suffer from idiosyncratic influences and 
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a small sample size. However, even with these concerns, plausible explanations are apparent for 
many individual years. The annual CAV results typically fall into two paradigms. Some annual 
election windows show elevated CAV due to political uncertainty during the event period while 
others indicated decreased CAV due to high volatility during the estimation period.  
[ Figures 16 & 17 about here] 
The election windows with the highest CAV have clear explanations and are significant 
at the 1% level. The Gulf War is coincident with the 1990 election, resulting in a 165% increase 
in implied volatility. Since the political uncertainty regarding US involvement may not have 
been a function of the midterm elections, this year presents a potentially confounding event. The 
9/11 attacks produce the large volatility spike 36 trading days before the election in 2001, 
resulting in a 78% implied volatility increase and confounding this election. Since there is no 
reason to believe that 9/11 was related to the local elections in 2001, this year is truncated 
throughout the analysis of results. However, the largest annual CAV result, an amazing 254% 
implied volatility increase beyond the benchmark level stems from political uncertainty around a 
key election. By all accounts, the presidential candidates in 2008 promoted differing approaches 
to the use of US military power. Accordingly, military contractors attempted to gain political 
access, with Barack Obama pocketing 34% more money from defense-contractor sources than 
John McCain despite McCain’s 23-year Navy career and extensive service on the Senate 
Committee on Armed Services (Thompson (2008)). This disparity in contributions may help 
explain why military contractors experienced large mean CARs that drove increased volatility in 
the months around the 2008 election. Of the three years with extremely high CAV, all have 
plausible explanations. 
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Election windows with the lowest CAV are due to high volatility in the two years prior to 
the election.  Since volatility projections for the event windows are produced using actual 
volatility data from the prior 500 trading days, extreme volatility events during the estimation 
period may confound the volatility parameters. The three lowest CAV all show evidence of mean 
reversion. The 2003 election with -50% implied volatility includes both 9/11 and the invasion of 
Iraq in the estimation period. The 2009 and 2010 elections with -58% and -50% implied 
volatility respectively include the 2008 election and uncertainty surrounding the withdraw from 
Iraq in their estimation periods. All three of these election windows show reduced CAV due to 
the high volatility during their estimation periods.  
Since there are both extremely high and low CAV years, outliers are a concern. There is 
even one year when the election uncertainty dragged on for weeks. In the 2000 election there 
was not a clear presidential victor until the United States Supreme Court issued the December 
12
th
 ruling on Bush v. Gore. Even so, this election does not drive CAV for the presidential 
category. Fortunately, the noisy volatility of individual years is moderated by using election 
categories to pool the volatility measures. As these figures are more intuitive than the tables, I 
employ these as a supplement to help communicate the results. Throughout the results section, 
Figures 18-42 provide a visual reference for the results reported in Tables VI-XI. Unless 
otherwise noted, my discussion of results focuses on the longest (-40, 40) event window. As the 
figures merely support the corresponding table results – in most cases – I do not independently 
discuss the figures. Analysis of the table results is sufficient for a quantitative assessment of the 
results, while the figures facilitate communication of the key findings. I present election category 
results to illustrate the link between political uncertainty and equity volatility. 
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6.2.1. Cumulative Abnormal Volatility Results (H1) 
In Table VI, I detail CAV by election category to provide test results for hypothesis one. 
Panel A provides descriptive summary information about the election category observations used 
to produce the CAV results. The sample size information shows a sufficient number of 
observations from which to draw statistically valid conclusions about the military contractor 
industry in the months around elections. Panels B & C facilitate direct comparison with Table 3 
of Białkowski et al. (2008) while Panel D provides pre-election event windows, which were not 
reported in their work. I employ the nomenclature of their tables to the extent possible, using the 
sample event windows plus the 40 day window. For example, (-5, 0) represents an event period 
beginning five trading days prior to the US election date and through the date, which is always 
on a Tuesday. The results presented here provide strong support for the hypothesis that elections 
are associated with an increase in the volatility of military contractor firms.  
[ Table VI about here] 
In Panel B of Table VI, CAV is presented for the six election categories; local, federal, 
presidential, midterm, pre-9/11 (peace), and post-9/11 (war). As noted earlier, the 2001 data is 
truncated due to the confounding effect of 9/11. For local elections, CAV reaches a value of 
8.725 over the 81-day event window. While this value may not appear intuitive, by construction, 
one can easily calculate a meaningful result. The percentage change in implied volatility relative 
to the benchmark is calculated by dividing CAV by the total number of days included in the 
event window. This calculation, Δ implied volatility = 8.725/81 = 11%, shows an increase in the 
implied volatility for local elections which is marginally significant at the 5% level. In contrast, 
federal elections show an implied volatility increase of 35% over the same period (1% 
significance). When the federal election category is sub-divided into presidential and midterm 
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categories the ordinal effects are expected, while the magnitude is surprising. Presidential 
elections increase volatility by 43% while midterms increase volatility by 27%, both significant 
at the 1% confidence level. The implied volatility increases 36% (1% significance) during peace 
time elections, while volatility increases 15% (5% significance) for elections during war. All six 
election categories exhibit a significant volatility increase, with the CAV magnitude indicating 
the importance of each category. The results of Panel B confirm that elections increase the equity 
volatility of military contractors due to political uncertainty.  
Panels C yields interesting results that deviate from the volatility observed around 
parliamentary elections. While the post-election CAV observed by Białkowski et al. (2008) is 
large and significant, in my results, only the presidential election category is associated with a 
large (37%) and significant (1%) volatility increase following the election. As suggested by 
Białkowski et al. (2008) elevated CAV in the post-election period is likely due to uncertainty 
associated with forming a government. To the extent that political uncertainty informs equity 
volatlity, the high volatility following a presidential election is likely a result of greater political 
uncertainty when the executive branch is involved. Many presidentially appointed positions are 
likely to materially impact military contractor firms growth opportunities. Cabinet positions 
including the Secerataries of: State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Energy all require 
Congressional approval so are often in flux for weeks or months following a presidential 
election. This result shows that political uncertainty translates directly to equity volatility for 
military contractor firms. 
The US presidential results support the Białkowski et al. (2008) conclusions, but the local 
and midterm elections show no evidence of CAV following the elections. This result is 
consistent with the notion that political uncertainty is resolved by elections which is quickly 
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reflected in reduced equity volatility. Since local and midterm elections typically lack this degree 
of secondary uncertainty, the CAV in these categories is not elevated post-election. These 
differences are presented more rigorously in the H2 results. Figures 18-21 provide a graphical 
depiction of the results in Table VI.  
[ Figures 18 - 21 about here] 
While the international elections of Białkowski et al. (2008) did not show elevated CAV 
in the pre-election period, the CAV of US military contractors is consistently higher pre-election 
than post-election. Panel D of Table VI shows that the pre-election event window is responsible 
for most of the volatility increase observed in the symmetric event window results reported in 
Panel B. The pre-election implied volatility increase is consistently greater than the percentage 
increase in implied volatility over the symmetric event window. Each election category shows 
significant CAV more than two weeks (10 trading days) prior to the election date. In the (-40, 0) 
window, the CAV is even greater. Only the local category shows a marginal volatility increase of 
14.7%, significant at 5%. Federal elections show a 50% increase in volatility which is significant 
at 1% confidence prior to the election. This effect remains consistent across both presidential and 
midterm election categories and is significant at 1%. By contrast, the international elections – 
which are overwhelmingly parliamentary – do not exhibit a volatility increase prior to the 
election date. This is consistent with the notion that parliamentary elections are only the first step 
to resolving political uncertainty since coalition governments may take weeks or even months to 
form.  
The substantial difference regarding the timing of the amplified equity volatility is a 
consequence of the channel for resolution of political uncertainty. Since a two-party political 
system results in more limited outcomes, firm-level expectations can be more readily assessed 
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ahead of elections. Given the vast array of possible coalition governments resulting from a 
parliamentary system, it may not be practical for investors to assess politically contingent firm-
level growth opportunities ahead of elections. I find that the timing of increased volatility is a 
function of the specific nature of political uncertainty. My results reinforce the extant literature 
illustrating the linkage between political uncertainty and equity volatility.  
6.2.2.  Differences Between Election Categories (H2) 
The results presented in Table VI indicate that volatility is a function of the election 
category. Since the magnitude of CAV differs by election category, I use CAV presented in 
Table VI to calculate the election category differences presented in Table VII. The statistics for 
these tables are based on the bootstrapped distribution shown in figure 15. Panel A of Table VII 
provides the difference in CAV between the two election categories over symmetric election 
windows extending to a maximum of (-40, 40). The CAV differences presented in Panels B & C 
of Table VII are based on the values from Panels C & D of Table VI. These results present 
strong evidence to support each of the three sub-sections of H2.  
[ Table VII about here] 
6.2.2.1. Federal Versus Local Elections (H2a) 
The first column in Panel A of Table VII presents the differences in CAV employed to 
test H2a. I subtract local CAV from federal CAV to show that implied volatility is 24% higher for 
federal than local elections, significant at the 5% level. The fact that federal elections produce 
more equity volatility than local elections is not surprising but the magnitude of the difference is 
substantial. This evidence yields strong support for H2a, suggesting that federal elections produce 
greater CAV than local elections. 
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The pre and post-election windows facilitate a nuanced analysis of the volatility 
dynamics. The first column of Panel B, Table VII shows no significant difference between the 
CAV of federal and local categories in the weeks after the election. Thus, the post-election 
volatility profile is similar for these election categories, consistent with the notion of elections 
resolving the political uncertainty related to growth opportunities of military contractors. 
However, Panel C shows that federal elections exhibit 35% greater volatility (5% significance) 
than local elections in the two months leading up to Election Day. This volatility ahead of the 
election is consistent with the notion that the US two-party system limits potential outcomes 
sufficiently to allow investors to analyze and trade ahead of the election, because political 
uncertainty is resolved in a predictable manner. These results reinforce the H1 findings: political 
uncertainty shows a positive relationship with equity volatility. The CAV difference between 
federal and local elections is illustrated in figure 22, to better convey these results.  
[ Figure 22 about here] 
The federal election category is further sub-divided into presidential and midterm 
elections to measure differentially impact of these election categories on volatility. In addition to 
the results presented in column one of Panel A of Table VII, I also test the difference between 
each sub-divided federal category and local elections. The volatility difference is more 
prominent when presidential CAV is compared to local elections CAV. During presidential 
elections, column three of Panel A shows that the implied volatility increases 32% above that of 
local elections, significant at the 1% level. However, column four of Panel A shows that midterm 
elections have only a 16% volatility increase over local elections, significant at the 5% level. 
Both midterm and presidential elections produce significantly greater volatility than do local 
elections but the effect is stronger for presidential elections. Even after controlling for the week 
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of the year, day of the week, the fact of an election, and near-perfect matching firms, I find that 
both presidential and midterm elections are associated with amplified equity volatility. 
Therefore, H2a is confirmed. The CAV differences between these election types are illustrated in 
figures 24 and 25.  
[ Figure 24 and 25 about here] 
6.2.2.2. Presidential Versus Midterm Elections (H2b) 
The prior results are consistent with the notion that presidential elections substantially 
increase volatility, while midterm elections are associated with less political uncertainty so 
generate a smaller change in volatility. To quantify this difference, I compare the CAV of the 
election categories. Column two of Panel A shows that presidential elections are associated with 
only 15% greater implied volatility than midterm elections. However, this difference only 
approaches a marginal level of significance (p-value = 0.12) over the (-40, 40) window so pre 
and post-election analysis is required to better understand the volatility dynamics.  
The results in column two of Panel B show that presidential elections produce 33% 
higher volatility than do midterm elections, significant at the 5% level. However, the column two 
of Panel C results show that the pre-election window has only a miniscule 0.1% volatility 
difference, which is obviously not significant. This further supports the notion that presidential 
elections produce greater volatility following the election as the secondary political positions are 
nominated by the president and the Congressional confirmation process begins. This lingering 
political uncertainty translates to equity volatility as military contractors are sensitive to the 
identity of these key decision makers.  
While conventional wisdom and much literature suggests that presidential elections 
matter vastly more than midterm elections, my results show that they exhibit substantial 
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similarities. Presidential and midterm elections both show 35% higher volatility (5% 
significance) than local elections in the eight weeks leading up to the election. There is little 
difference between midterm and local elections in the eight weeks after the election. However, 
presidential elections are associated with 30% higher volatility (5% significance) than local 
elections in the eight weeks following the election. As such, while support for H2b in the 
symmetric event window is marginal at best, there is good evidence for H2b in the post-election 
window. This result shows that political uncertainty ahead of the two election categories is 
associated with a similar effect on volatility but the post-election political uncertainty is 
different. The only plausible explanation is that equity volatility is positively related to political 
uncertainty. Figure 23 illustrates the CAV difference between presidential and midterm 
elections. 
[ Figure 23 about here] 
6.2.2.3. War Versus Peace (H2c) 
This hypothesis tests the notion that equity volatility around elections depends on the fact 
of military conflict. I compare the relatively peaceful period before 9/11 (1989-2000) with the 
sustained period of war after 9/11 (2001-2012). The results in column five of Panel A show that 
the equity volatility of military contractors is 22% less during war than during peace, significant 
at the 5% level. While it is tempting to assume that war always increases political uncertainty, 
this may not be so. However, the results show greater volatility during peace which supports the 
sole super-power discretion hypothesis. Figure 26 illustrates the CAV difference between post-
9/11 and pre-9/11 elections. 
[ Figure 26 about here] 
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The time period analysis shows greater peace time volatility in Panel A but the dynamics 
around the election shows more detail.  In column five of Panel B of Table VII, the difference 
between elections held in peace or war is 34% lower post-election volatility (5% significance) 
during war. This may indicate that US voters produce authoritative resolution of political 
uncertainty connected to the critical issue of armed conflict. This notion is consistent with the 
nation falling in line behind the leadership of the commander-in-chief during a time of war, 
regardless of individual political views. In Panel C, there is no substantial pre-election volatility 
difference between war and peace. This indicates that pre-election CAV is always elevated 
regardless of the fact of war. Once again, these results are consistent with the notion that equity 
volatility is positively related to political risk. 
6.2.3. National Security and War Index (H3) 
My third hypothesis tests the proposition that political uncertainty regarding national 
security and war is linked with the equity volatility of military contractors. If political 
uncertainty does cause an increase in equity volatility, the difference should be most apparent 
between the highest and lowest quartiles of the Baker et al. (2013) national security and war 
uncertainty index. These results provide overwhelming evidence that national security and war 
uncertainty in the month of September predicts equity volatility throughout the four months 
surrounding federal elections. These results confirm a strong positive relationship between 
political uncertainty and equity volatility. I include Table VIII and corresponding figures to 
provide the raw CAV values for the quartiles, but the discussion is focused on the differences 
between these quartile results. Figures 27-29 illustrate the CAV for high and low uncertainty 
index quartiles of federal election categories. 
[ Table VIII about here] 
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[ Figures 27- 29 about here] 
The differences between the index quartiles are presented in Table IX. As expected, 
federal elections with a high level of national security and war uncertainty show much greater 
volatility than elections with low levels of uncertainty. The implied volatility for federal 
elections is 134% greater (1% significance) for the top quartile than for the lowest quartile. Since 
there are 12 federal election cycles, the top three are compared to the bottom three. However, 
with six each of presidential and midterm elections, I compare the top two to the bottom two, 
resulting in smaller differences between the national security and war index values. As an artifact 
of the sample sizes, the implied volatility is lower when the federal category is sub-divided into 
presidential (106%) and midterm (67%) elections, although it remains significant at the 1% level 
for each. These exceptionally strong results demonstrate the utility of the Baker et al. (2013) 
national security and war index as a predictive measure. These results provide compelling 
evidence that political uncertainty drives equity volatility.  
[ Table IX about here] 
Importantly, local elections do not follow a similar pattern. In fact, local elections exhibit 
CAV that is 43% less for the highest uncertainty quartile (1% significance) than for the lowest 
quartile. Consistent with mean reversion, when index value is among the top quartile, it is 
expected to decline in subsequent months. While a bottom quartile index value is expected to 
increase in subsequent months. If the national security and war uncertainty index is positively 
related to equity volatility, then any event window with an inconsequential or even a marginal 
event, should exhibit mean reversion of equity volatility along with the index. This pattern of 
mean reversion is well illustrated in figure 30. Additionally, given the mean reversion of the 
index value, the extreme results for federal, presidential, and midterm elections would be even 
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greater without this bias. Effectively, the mean reversion induces a bias against finding 
significant differences between quartiles. The fact of such overwhelming results despite this bias 
suggests an extremely strong positive relationship between political uncertainty and equity 
volatility of military contractors.  
[ Figure 30 about here] 
Panels B & C of Table IX show that the CAV differences are large and significant in both 
pre-election and postelection windows. As noted previously, in contrast to parliamentary 
elections, the pre-election volatility is consistently greater than post-election. While the 168% 
pre-election implied volatility increase is more pronounced than the 102% post-election volatility 
increase, both are extreme differences and significant at the 1% level. This general pattern holds 
for both presidential (118% vs. 97%) and midterm (86% vs. 48%) elections, all significant at the 
1% level. This shows that elevated uncertainty in September is not only associated with pre-
election volatility but is also predictive of post-election volatility. The national security and war 
index value may link highly uncertain elections with period of extended equity volatility 
resolution. Once again, these results are consistent with the notion that political risk dictates 
equity volatility. Figures 31-34 illustrate the CAV differences between high and low uncertainty 
index categories. 
[ Figures 31- 34 about here] 
6.2.4. Share of Sales to the Military (H4) 
My fourth hypothesis test is structured to determine if the strength of a military 
contractor’s business relationship with the government impacts the firm’s equity volatility. I test 
for evidence of channels linking political risk to equity volatility. There are two plausible routes 
by which political influence may impact the firm. Under the regulatory capture theory, the share 
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of sales to the military mitigates equity volatility around elections because firms which derive a 
high portion of revenue from military contracts will purchase political influence regardless of the 
election winner.
28
 Under the alternative political risk hypothesis, the share of sales to the military 
increases volatility around elections due to the political risk of gaining or losing access to 
military contracts. This is an empirical question tested using the share variable from the SIPRI 
data. These results provide only weak and inconsistent support for the regulatory capture 
explanation. Much like with H3, for H4, I include Table X and corresponding figures to provide 
the raw CAV values for the quartiles, but the discussion is focused on the differences between 
the quartile results. Figures 35-38 illustrate the CAV for high and low share of sales to the 
military (share) quartiles. 
[ Table X about here] 
[ Figures 35 - 38 about here] 
Table XI presents the differences between the share quartiles. In column one of Panel A 
of Table XI, the (-40, 40) event window for federal elections shows military contractors with the 
highest share of sales to the military (top quartile) have 29% lower volatility (1% significance) 
than firms among the lowest share quartile.
29
 In all columns and panels of this table, the military 
contractors with the highest share of sales to the military exhibit less volatility around elections. 
However, these results are inconsistently significant. In the symmetric event window of Panel A, 
with a 48% lower volatility for the top share quartile, only midterm elections show significance 
                                                 
 
28
 As suggested by Dr. Dorn, politicians could also be influence by a large firm employing voters in their 
Congressional district. While I lack the data to directly account for this, my robustness checks include a proxy for 
the size of the firm. Since firm size is positively correlated with the number of voters employed, the robustness 
regressions may better isolate the effects of the share of sales to the military. 
29
 As suggested by Dr. Kim, I could use only the largest firms in this analysis since they are more likely to exert real 
political influence via stronger political connections. This will be tested post-dissertation defense. Thank you. 
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at the 1% level. Local elections show 19% lower volatility for the top share quartile, but this is 
marginal (10% significance). Interestingly, the presidential results do not show a significant 
difference in CAV between the share quartiles. Since all firms may be substantially impacted by 
presidential elections, this result remains inconclusive without the context of a reference study 
that provides equity volatility dynamics for all types of firms. Since only the midterm elections 
are associated with lower volatility for the most focused military contractors, there is not a clear 
finding for H4.  
[ Table XI about here] 
Overall, there is only marginal or inconsistent evidence that firms with a high share of 
sales to the military exhibit reduced equity volatility around elections. The limited evidence, 
such as it is, provides only a weak support for the regulatory capture hypothesis. Since literature 
suggests that elections induce volatility throughout the market, a firm conclusion about 
regulatory capture cannot be made given these results, without information about the equity 
volatility response of non-military contractors to presidential elections. Another possible 
explanation for this inconclusive result is the absence of a good control for endogeneity. 
Unfortunately, this is a problem since the percentage of sales to the military and the firms’ 
exposure to political uncertainty via the political lobbying channel may be simultaneously 
determined. To the extent that firms can redirect assets to growth opportunities unconnected to 
politics, this endogeneity will create a bias against finding significant equity volatility 
differences, between high and low share firms. As such, this bias makes finding equally of 
volatility between the groups more likely rather than less. In the robustness check section, I 
address this issue in greater detail using share as a variable in the cross-sectional regressions but 
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find similar inconclusive results. Figures 39-42 illustrate the CAV differences between the high 
and low share categories. 
[ Figures 39 - 42 about here] 
6.2.5. Daily Volatility Profile (H5) 
I present a simple piecewise daily equity volatility model which explains a substantial 
portion of military contractors’ daily volatility in the months around elections. This model 
provides strong evidence of a distinct volatility profile around elections. For every election 
category, consistent with the image displayed in figure 4, I find that daily volatility increases in 
the weeks leading up to an election, declines sharply at the election, and is non-positive in the 
weeks following the election. This pattern emerges in all election categories and is particularly 
prominent in elections associated with elevated uncertainty about national security and war 
policy. My parsimonious model is predictive of equity volatility around elections. 
Models of the daily volatility measure by election category, Mt,c , during the election 
window (-40, 40) are presented in Table XII. In Panel A, I provide mean and median volatility 
measures in the symmetric event window, the pre-election window, and the postelection window 
to provide a reference level of for volatility. The top line of Panel A, shows that mean daily 
volatility is greater than the baseline volatility over the four months around all election 
categories, significant at the 1% level except for the post 9/11 period (5% significance).  Since 
the volatility measure follows a chi-square distribution, typically the mean volatility exceeds the 
median due to the right skew. Both of these averages are included to demonstrate that despite 
this skew, the high volatility outliers are not driving the results. For each election category, the 
pre-election volatility exceeds the postelection volatility as suggested by the results presented in 
H1 – H4. 
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[ Table XII about here] 
The essential daily equity volatility model findings are presented in Panel B of Table XII. 
The α values are the four time point volatility measures and the β values are the two time trend 
volatility measures displayed in figure 4. The key finding of this table is the clear evidence of a 
distinct volatility profile in the four months around elections.  
The top line of Panel B provides the daily volatility 40 days prior to the election date. A 
full two months before the election, volatility is typically near the benchmark level of one, 
except in the case of midterm elections where the volatility is 34% higher than the benchmark 
and significant at the 1% level. This top line generally indicates that daily equity volatility at the 
beginning of the traditional campaign season is near the benchmark level of volatility. However, 
the elevated volatility in midterm election years may suggest that daily volatility begins to 
increase before early September or confounding events such as the Gulf War in 1990 produce 
this result. Daily equity volatility measures near one suggest that a (-40, 40) event window is 
sufficient to capture the majority of the volatility profile around elections. 
Across all election categories, the second line of Panel B shows that the change in daily 
volatility, β, is positive and significant at the 1% level for all categories except midterm 
elections. In the presidential election category, volatility increases 2.5% every day over the 8 
weeks prior to the election while local elections show a daily volatility increase of 1% per day. 
Again, Midterm elections do not seem to fit as they exhibit a volatility increase of only 0.8% per 
day. However, this may stem from the high starting value for daily volatility. If so, the midterm 
election daily volatility increase is likely an underestimate due to the high initial volatility level 
two months prior to the election. This unusual result for the midterm election requires more 
investigation but is not a critical flaw as it is qualitatively if not quantitatively similar to the other 
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results. This increase in daily volatility is consistent with the notion that investors accelerate 
trading on expectations ahead of US elections. 
By the election date, line three shows that volatility is amplified across all election 
categories, significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the daily volatility measures on election 
day is generally consistent with the prior hypotheses. In the presidential election category, 
volatility doubles, while midterms are associated with a 67% increase, and local elections show a  
35% increase. To state this more succinctly, local elections increase volatility to a maximum of 
one third above the benchmark level, midterm elections double that, and presidential elections 
triple the volatility increase of local elections. I suggest that this result may be used as a rule of 
thumb to gage the relative importance of these election categories. Overall, this high daily 
volatility level across all election categories provides strong evidence of a positive link between 
political uncertainty and equity volatility. Volatility increases pre-election, leading to a 
significantly higher level of volatility on the election day, regardless of the election category.  
A piecewise volatility model allows for volatility resolution on the election date and a 
new volatility time-trend post-election. The fourth line in Panel B indicates a drastic daily 
volatility decline at the election. In local and midterm elections, immediately after election 
results become public, the model shows daily volatility decline to just 13% above the benchmark 
level, only marginally significant at the 10% level. However, for the presidential election 
category, daily volatility declines substantially but still remains 50% above the benchmark level, 
which is significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with the explanation of H2, that 
presidential elections are associated with greater volatility post-election because the second tier 
of decision makers awaits nomination and confirmation by Congress. It seems that in presidential 
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election years, there is an expectation that some real political uncertainty about the prospects of 
military contractors will be resolved during the “Lame Duck” session of Congress.  
Over the two months following the election, line 5 of Panel B shows a daily volatility 
change that is non-positive. The daily volatility may slowly decline in the post-election period,  
but this daily decrease is not even marginally significant. By the time that Congress is sworn into 
office in early January, the daily equity volatility is indistinguishable from the benchmark 
volatility level. Considering the non-positive daily volatility time trend and the return to a 
benchmark level of volatility, whatever lingering political uncertainty following the election is 
substantially resolved over the subsequent two months. 
The piecewise daily volatility model describes the equity volatility of military contractors 
in the months around elections. This model produces an adjusted R
2 
value of 9% for the local 
election category and 36% for the federal election category. This yields strong evidence for a 
non-constant daily equity volatility profile, driven by political uncertainty. Again, I apply a 
similar approach in the robustness checks section to more explicitly detail the dynamics between 
political uncertainty and equity volatility, in the months around US elections. 
6.3. Robustness Check Results 
I present detailed robustness checks to support the findings of three hypotheses. All three 
employ firm-level volatility measures (5) to present a more fine-tuned volatility picture. 
However, they may be more susceptible to model misspecification due to the asymptotic 
adjustment used to construct Mt,c  from (6). The firm-level daily volatility measure,         is 
employed in regressions to produce evidence for the national security and war uncertainty 
hypothesis, H3, and the share of sales to the military hypothesis, H4. Firm-level characteristics 
are included as control variables to isolate the effects of the index and share variables 
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respectively. The volatility profile hypothesis, H5, is also re-tested using the firm-level volatility 
approach. Tables XIII – XVII present results that reinforce my findings.  
6.3.1. Robustness of National  Security and War (H3) 
While the national security and war index value also serves as an annual fixed effect, a 
regression using control variables is used to explain the firm-level daily volatility variable,        . 
The results, presented in Table XIII, reinforce the findings of Table IX which provide evidence 
of a strong positive relationship between national security and war uncertainty in the month of 
September and CAV in the months around elections. 
[Table XIII about here] 
Table XIII presents results of regressions to explain the CAV of individual firms for each 
election category during the (-40, 40) election window. Regressions are run using the widely 
used firm-level control variables leverage, ROA, Tobin’s Q, and firm size to help isolate the 
impact of the national security and war index. The overall model fit is strong, with the F-values 
significant at 1% in all cases and the adjusted R
2
 values exceeding 10% for all federal elections. 
The market to book ratio is inversely related to CAV around federal elections at 1% signficance. 
This indicates that low growth opportunities are associated with amplified political sensitivity, 
which translates to increased equity volatility. The positive relationship between size and CAV 
suggests that larger firms have greater equity volatility around elections. This may be an artifact 
of larger military contractors having more at stake during election season. Ultimately, these firm-
level controls are used to isolate the impact of the key variable of interest, Index.  
The September national security and war index value is a strong leading indicator of 
military contractors’ equity volatility around elections. In presidential election years, each index 
point increases CAV by 3.0%, significant at 1%, while midterm years remain significant at 5% 
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but only increase CAV by 0.6% per index point. These results are consistent with the notion of 
greater political uncertainty leading to elevated equity volatility. In local elections, the inverse 
relationship between the index and CAV is easily explained by mean reversion. Since local 
elections should have little effect on equity volatilitiy via political uncertainty, above average 
levels of national security and war uncertainty should decay while below average should increase 
during local election years. This is exactly the result that is observed, significant at 1%. 
Additionally, mean reversion of the national security and war index creates a bias against finding 
a positive relationship between CAV and the index. Since a positive relationship during federal 
election years is identified, these results are even more impressive. Therefore, the national 
security and war uncertainty hypothesis has very strong support. The national security and war 
index presents a strong link between political uncertainty and equity volatility. 
6.3.2. Robustness of Share of Sales (H4) 
Since a quartile analysis of CAV based on the share of sales to the military lack sufficient 
detail, share is included in regressions with firm-level control variables to show the effect on the 
firm-level daily volatility variable,        . This approach indicates the continuous effect of 
additional shares of sales to the military. The results, presented in Table XIV, fail to strengthen 
the weak support for the captured regulator hypothesis presented in Table XI. However, these 
results also fail to support the election risk hypothesis, leaving this issue unresolved.  
[Table XIV about here] 
Table XIV presents results of regressions to explain the CAV of individual firms for each 
election category during the (-40, 40) election window. Regressions are run using the widely 
used firm-level control variables leverage, ROA, Tobin’s Q, and firm size to help isolate the 
impact of the share of sales to the military. The overall model fit is strong, with the F-values 
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significant at 1% in all cases and the adjusted R
2
 values exceeding 35% for all federal elections. 
The market to book ratio is inversely related to CAV only in presidential elections at 5% 
signficance. This provides some evidence that low growth opportunities are associated with 
amplified political sensitivity in presidential election years, which translates to increased equity 
volatility. The positive relationship between size and CAV suggests that larger firms have greater 
equity volatility around elections, significant at 1% in all categories except local elections where 
significance is at the 5% level. This may be an artifact of larger military contractors having more 
at stake during election season. Ultimately, these firm-level controls are used to isolate the 
impact of the key variable of interest, Share.  
The share of sales to the military does not show a strong relationship to firm-level CAV.  
In fact, the coefficients are not even marginally significant and are not economically meaningful. 
The lack of a relationship between the share of sales to the military and CAV in presidential 
elections damages support for the election risk hypothesis. Due to the expected bias against 
differences between the categories, a better understanding of how political uncertainty impacts 
the volatility of non-military contractors is important. However, there is no support for the 
alternative regulatory capture hypothesis either. Given the inconsistent support for the regulatory 
capture hypothesis presented in table XI, conclusive evidence is lacking. As such, H4 remains 
unresolved.  A new approach with additional industry perspective will be required to elicit clear 
results for this hypothesis. 
6.3.3. Robustness of Daily Volatility (H5) 
Table XV presents the volatility model results based on firm-level analysis over the (-
40,40) election window. To prevent misspecification of the individual firm-year models, a non-
negative constraint is imposed to ensure meaningful volatility values at each time point, as 
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shown in figure 4. This constraint reduces the model fit (10) to achieve valid volatility values, 
thus producing a bias against finding slope parameters, β, with large absolute values.30 This firm-
level analysis ensures that the volatility resolution on the election date is significant. As a 
robustness check it adds certainty that the variance in individual firm volatility does not preclude 
a significant result. These results reinforce the conclusions drawn from table XII by displaying a 
similar volatility profile. 
Table XV presents mean and median firm-level volatility model parameters in Panels A 
and B respectively. The mean volatility 40 trading days before the election is not significantly 
different from the benchmark volatility for local elections while it is 20.7% higher for federal 
elections (5% significance), once again, this is driven by the midterm elections. The increase in 
daily volatility, βpre, ahead of the election is consistent with the results presented in Table XII 
results for H5. The largest difference is in presidential elections where mean daily volatility 
increase is 2.5% on a pooled basis and 2.2% on a firm-specific basis. On election day, volatility 
declines sharply due to the resolution of political risk. This election day daily volatility 
resolution effect is 28% for Federal (1% significance) and 16% for local elections (5% 
significance). Just as with Table XII, immediately following the election, volatility remains 
elevated above the benchmark level. For Federal elections, it remains 30% above the benchmark 
level (1% significance) and for local, volatility remains 13% above (5% significance). In the 40 
trading days following the election, volatility appears non-positive but with only marginal 
significance in the mean model results (the median do have significant negative values). At 40 
trading days after the election, volatility has largely returned to normal levels with local elections 
                                                 
 
30
 In the unconstrained model, volatility time trends are more pronounced and the confidence interval is even 
greater. 
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only 3% higher (not significance) than the benchmark and federal only 12% higher (10% 
significance). These results reinforce the findings presented in Table XII, consistently showing 
the volatility profile as displayed in figure 4. This provides strong evidence in support of the 
election period volatility profile hypothesis. 
Tables XVI and XVII provide additional robustness checks for the volatility profile based 
on the quartile analysis for H3 and H4. These results show that the previously identified volatility 
profile is amplified when national security and war uncertainty is high, consistent with the 
conclusions presented in H3. The volatility profile is only marginally amplified for firms with a 
smaller share of sales to the military, consistent with the inconclusive results for H4. The results 
of these additional robustness checks provide extra support for the prior findings. 
[Table XVI and XVII about here] 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions  
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to document firm-level daily equity 
volatility profiles around all categories of US elections. My results demonstrate a powerful and 
pervasive link between political uncertainty and equity volatility. I find evidence that local, 
midterm, and presidential elections all significantly amplify the equity volatility of military 
contractors in the (-40, 40) election window. Local elections increase CAV by 11%, midterms by 
27%, and presidential by 43%. This strongly suggests that midterm and even local elections play 
a role in shaping the growth opportunities for military contractors. While a large body of finance 
literature focuses on presidential elections, my analysis compares presidential, midterm and even 
local elections. 
All the election categories exhibit generally similar patterns, with differences found 
mainly in the magnitude of the impact. I measure this link between equity volatility and political 
uncertainty for election categories: local, federal, presidential, midterm, peace, and war. Extant 
literature focuses heavily on presidential elections but my finding demonstrate that local and 
Congressional political uncertainty also substantial inform equity volatility. Local elections 
increase daily equity volatility by about one third over the benchmark volatility level, midterm 
elections by two thirds over the benchmark, and presidential elections typically double the daily 
equity volatility.  
In contrast with equity volatility results from an international sample, US elections 
generate most of the equity volatility in the weeks ahead of the election, rather than after voting. 
I also compare the volatility of election categories. To highlight this results, I show that midterm 
and presidential elections produce quantitatively similar impacts on volatility ahead of elections, 
it is only in the post-election period that presidential elections generate substantially greater 
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(30%) equity volatility. This finding is explained by the political uncertainty tied to the 
presidential nomination and Congressional confirmation process. All elections generate a distinct 
daily volatility profile – as shown in figure 4 – which I model with a parsimonious function. My 
central contribution is quantifying the impact of political uncertainty on the equity volatility of 
military contractors, facilitating predictive applications around US elections. 
My key predictive approach applies the Baker et al. (2013) national security and war 
uncertainty index to estimate daily equity volatility in the months around elections. For example, 
in the federal election category, the highest uncertainty index quartile exhibits 134% greater 
volatility than the lowest index quartile. In addition to predicting volatility, I validate the utility 
of this new index in a practical finance application.  
These findings are important for academics and carry practical implications for the 
finance industry. In scholarly work, these findings may be most readily applied to finance, 
economics, and political science research. In the finance industry, my findings can be used to 
improve estimates for vega around elections. 
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Chapter 8: Future Research 
As political uncertainty creates a differential impact on the range of industries, it is likely 
to produce an industry-dependent equity volatility response around elections. Even with this non-
comprehensive sample of military contractors, there is a wide range of industries. The military 
contractor firms represent 19 two-digit, 47 three-digit, and 62 four-digit SIC codes. Perhaps more 
importantly, nearly half (23) of the 48 industry groups identified by Fama and French (1997) are 
represented. This disparate representation of industries makes any political dynamics focused on 
a particular industry or range of business issues difficult to discern.
31
 Additionally, the CRSP and 
Compustat datasets present serious challenges when attempting industry analysis, military 
contractor or otherwise.
32
 Despite the challenges of industry classification, since this collection 
of firms is based on sales to the military, it provides unique insight into the military contractor 
industry. An index of equity volatility around US elections by industry group would be useful in 
placing this military contractor research in context. Research using a pan-industry sample would 
provide a much broader understanding of the link between political uncertainty and equity 
volatility. 
This equity volatility research could also be extended to show the impact of political 
uncertainty based on actual election results using voting data.
 
This research could bridge the gap 
between political science and finance in such a manner to greatly inform both disciplines. 
                                                 
 
31
 Question to WRDS: Is CRSP SICH better than Compustat SICCD?  Answer from Ticket #632-8606050 on 
1JUL13: It depends on your research goals.  SICH is the historical SIC code, as opposed to header company data -  
e.g. the SIC code as it was at the time of the data date. Also, CRSP does not assign SIC codes themselves but takes 
them from the exchanges (NASAQ, AMEX, etc.) In contrast, Compustat does put in some investigation on its own 
when assigning SIC codes.  So, it would depend on whether you have greater faith in the exchange or Compustat. 
I use the CRSP SICH in this research as it provides data for each year. 
32
 Only 20% of firm-year observations have an exact match between the Compustat SICCD and the CRSP SICH. 
Again, this reinforces the difficulty of identifying military contractors by industry group. 
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Election results data for the House of Representatives, Senate, and presidential contests is 
available from various sources. However, one cannot clearly quantify the difference in firm 
growth opportunities associated with individual candidates or parties. The notion that one party 
is always better for defense contractors is an extremely strong assumption, so partisan research is 
a challenge. It is exceptionally impractical, if not impossible, to assign motivations for voting 
behavior. This is true among the general electorate and among elected politicians since bills 
often come with a bundle of riders and attachments. As such, it is extremely difficult to quantify 
the link between the political uncertainty and equity volatility based on voting data. While the 
obstacles to this type of research are serious, the implications are great.  
The daily equity volatility profile presented in this research is a simple model. Of course, 
there may be superior models for daily volatility but is a topic for a future paper. Advanced 
models of daily equity volatility are better suited for dedicated model builders.
33
 My simple daily 
volatility model demonstrates the existence of a volatility profile around elections and suggests 
the magnitude of the effect but does not definitively prove the best fit. An advanced model of 
daily volatility may substantially improve the profile.   
Overall, my findings promise important practical applications for equity traders, options 
traders, and portfolio managers. Election categories are strongly associated with differential 
impacts on equity volatility. This is due to varying levels of political uncertainty which is largely 
predictable using the Baker et al. (2013) index. This leading indicator of volatility, may be 
exploited by options traders to impove Vega estimates during the months surrounding elections. 
                                                 
 
33
 For instance, the Chow (1960) test could be employed to detect a structural break at the election. However, since 
the Chow test does not determine timing of a break, the Bai and Perron (2003) technique may be superior. 
Additionally, one might model equity volatililty with something more complex than a simple piecewise linear 
function. Some time of sigmoid, exponential, logarithmic, or other function may well produce a better fit. 
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An election-season trading strategy for military contractors firms can be designed around these 
findings. This important contribution to the asset pricing of derivatives, might be most directly 
employed by informing trading band analytics. While these techniques typically rely on moving 
first and second moment analysis, the implications of my results facilitate a predictive 
component. For instance, equity volatility could be modeled using a Bollinger band, 
supplemented with an additional predictive term based on these results. This improved estimate 
of implied volatility should lead to more profitable trading performance around elections. 
The relationship between political uncertainty and equity volatility may be a function of 
the time horizon.
34
 While my research focuses on the link between political uncertianty and 
equity volatility in the months around elections, it could also be observed in greater detail using 
intraday data in the hours around election results. This may allow for greater analysis of partisan 
political influence on military contractor firms.  
  
                                                 
 
34
 I thank Dr. Dorn for advocating this approach to the political uncertainty and equity volatility dynamic.  
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APPENDIX B – DESCRIPTIVE TABLES 
 
Tables Source Variable Definition
CARs Cumulative abnormal returns
CAV Cumulative abnormal volatility
Compustat A database of financial, statistical and market information, Centennial, CO, United States.
CRSP The Center for Research in Security Prices,  Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago.
GARCH (1,1) Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity with p = 1 and q = 1.
OLS Ordinary least squares
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Solna, Sweden.
MEVEC Multiplicative effect of volatility by election category
II SIPRI Arms Sales Dollar value of military goods and services to military customers, including both saless for domestic procurement and sales for export.
II SIPRI Rank Global ranking of a military contractor firm based on total arms sales, with the largest firm having a rank of one.
II SIPRI Share Arms Sales / Total Revenue of the firm
II US gov't SIC Standard Industrial Classification
III US gov't All US elections are held every year on the first Tuesday to fall on November 2nd through November 8th.
III US gov't Federal Elections in even years that have candidates for Congress. Half of these also include candidates for the President of the United States.
III US gov't Local Elections in odd years that typically do not have candidates for Congress.
III US gov't Mid-term Elections in the even years between presidential elections. These include candidates for Congress but not for the President of the United States.
III US gov't Presidential Elections in years divisible by 4. These include both candidates for Congress and the President of the United States.
III BBD National Security  The uncertainty component from newspapers that specifically relates to national security or war. 
III BBD News-based The uncertainty component from 10 large US newspapers comprises 50% of the overall economic policy uncertainty index
III BBD Policy Overall economic uncertainty index value.
III BAS Doomsday Clock Represents the danger of global catastrophy. Published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists at the University of Chicago.
IV Compustat AT Total Assets of a company at a point in time. 
IV Compustat CAPX Capital Expenditures
IV Compustat CEQ The sum of Common/Ordinary Stock (Capital) (CSTK), Capital Surplus/Share Premium Reserve (CAPS) and Retained Earnings (RE).
IV Compustat CSHO The net number of all common shares outstanding at year-end, excluding treasury shares and scrip.
IV Compustat DD1 Long-Term Debt Due in One Year
IV Compustat DLTT Long-Term Debt - Total
IV Compustat MKVALT Consolidated company-level market value is the sum of all issue-level market values, including trading and non-trading issues. 
IV Compustat NI Net income represents the fiscal period income or loss reported by a company after subtracting expenses and losses from all revenues and gains.
IV Compustat OANCF Operating Activities Net Cash Flow
IV Compustat OIBDP Operating Income Before Depreciation using the U.S. and Canadian GAAP Definition
IV Compustat SALE Total Sales represents gross sales (the amount of actual billings to customers for regular sales completed during the period).
IV Compustat XRD Research and Development Expense
IV Calculated Cash Flow/Sales Operating Cash Flow over Sales (OANCF/SALE)
IV Calculated CERDATR Capital Expenditure and Research & Development to Assets Ratio (CAPX + XRD)/AT
IV Calculated Leverage Debt to Total Assets Ratio (DLTT + DD1)/AT. 
IV Calculated Profit Margin Net Income to Sales Ratio (NI/SALE)
IV Calculated ROA Return on Assets (NI/AT)
IV Calculated ROE Return on Equity (NI/CEQ)
IV Calculated Tobin's Q (simple) Market to Book Ratio (MKVALT/AT)
IV Calculated Tobin's Q (Chung) Applies the Chung and Pruitt (1994) method
V (1) α The idiosyncratic component of returns.
V (1) β The systematic component of returns.
V (2) γ 0 The minimum level of conditional variance.
V (2) γ 1 The coefficient on lagged conditional variance.
V (2) γ 2 The coefficient on lagged squared abnormal return.
V (1) ε Abnormal component of returns.
V (1) h Conditional variance of returns.
V (5) Q Firm-level daily volatility measure.
Table I: Variable Definitons
Table I the variable definitions and acronyms found in the paper. Table indicates where each variable first appears. Source indicates the origin of the data used to construct each variable.
Variable gives the name of the item. 
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Fama French Year(s)
48 Industry Groups Total Mean Max Median Min
1 AAR Corp 5080 Wholesale 9 41.7 53.0 39.1 36.0
2 3728 Aircraft 1 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0
3 3460 Fabricated Products 4 66.5 74.0 65.5 61.0
4 3825 Measuring and Control Equipment 5 34.8 42.0 34.0 29.0
5 3674 Electronic Equipment 6 38.3 43.0 41.5 29.0
6 Alcoa 3350 Steel Works Etc 1 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
7 Allegheny Technologies 3312 Steel Works Etc 4 9.3 12.0 9.3 6.5
8 3480 Defense 14 73.1 97.4 70.1 53.5
9 3760 Defense 6 63.8 78.8 61.8 57.7
10 3724 Aircraft 7 12.2 15.1 12.6 8.9
11 3714 Automobiles and Trucks 2 9.3 10.1 9.3 8.5
12 Anteon 7373 Computers 2 88.5 89.0 88.5 88.0
13 Applied Signal Technology 3663 Electronic Equipment 15 14.8 23.1 14.0 3.8
14 Argon ST 3812 Electronic Equipment 7 76.1 93.9 73.0 55.9
15 7381 Business Services 1 53.1 53.1 53.1 53.1
16 3842 Medical Equipment 8 49.7 81.7 39.8 25.1
17 AT&T 4813 Communication 5 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0
18 Avondale Industries 3730 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 9 77.4 86.8 76.8 68.3
19 Ball 3411 Shipping Containers 6 5.7 6.3 5.7 5.1
20 2800 Chemicals 1 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
21 3724 Aircraft 3 6.0 6.6 6.3 5.1
22 Boeing 3721 Aircraft 23 33.9 55.2 32.4 14.9
23 Brunswick 3730 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 1 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6
24 CACI International 7373 Computers 20 63.5 79.9 63.8 49.0
25 Ceradyne 3290 Construction Materials 8 57.1 76.2 61.3 29.0
26 3571 Computers 2 50.7 51.0 50.7 50.4
27 8721 Business Services 3 36.9 38.2 37.0 35.4
28 Computer Data Systems 7373 Computers 1 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0
29 7373 Computers 5 30.3 35.5 29.3 27.0
30 7370 Business Services 19 25.7 37.5 25.6 14.5
31 Control Data 7373 Computers 1 19.1 19.1 19.1 19.1
32 Cordant Technologies 3320 Steel Works Etc 2 14.6 16.0 14.6 13.1
33 3812 Electronic Equipment 16 60.1 72.0 60.1 42.6
34 3829 Measuring and Control Equipment 4 43.8 47.3 43.7 40.4
35 3578 Computers 1 62.7 62.7 62.7 62.7
36 Cummins Engines 3510 Machinery 6 2.7 5.1 2.5 1.1
37 3590 Machinery 3 31.3 41.0 32.3 20.6
38 3728 Aircraft 10 41.9 50.0 41.5 30.0
39 DRS Technologies 3812 Electronic Equipment 12 91.5 98.0 92.4 75.8
40 Ducommun 3728 Aircraft 11 58.9 66.1 59.9 48.9
41 Dyncorp 7381 Business Services 2 67.0 74.0 67.0 60.0
42 Eaton 3714 Automobiles and Trucks 2 6.6 7.1 6.6 6.1
43 EDO 3812 Electronic Equipment 14 80.4 92.1 84.6 65.9
44 EDS 7370 Business Services 9 5.7 11.5 4.8 2.5
45 3621 Electrical Equipment 1 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6
46 3823 Measuring and Control Equipment 1 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
47 Engineered Support Systems 3585 Machinery 7 89.5 95.1 93.1 78.7
48 3812 Electronic Equipment 3 80.1 81.6 80.4 78.3
49 3537 Automobiles and Trucks 1 68.6 68.6 68.6 68.6
50 3569 Machinery 3 45.0 50.5 43.5 40.9
BFGoodrich
Ceridian
Share Information
Esco Electronics
Table II: US Public Military Contractor Firms
Table II presents the US public military contractor firms included in the sample from 1989-2012. Each firm year observation meets the following
requirements: included in the SIPRI database as a top 300 global military contractor, included in Compustat with positive common equity (CEQ > 0),
and has the full 500 daily return values in CRSP during the estimation period. The Company Name is the name of the firm as recorded in the SIPRI
database. The 48 Industry Groups are identified by the Industry Group - Long Name (Fama and French (1997)). Year(s) in sample provides the total
number of years in the sample for a firm with a given historical SIC code (SICH). Share Information gives summary statistics of the SIPRI variable,
Share (arms sales divided by total sales). 
Obs # Company Name
SIC 
Code
Cubic Corporation
Armor Holdings
Advanced Technical Products
Aeroflex
Alliant Techsystems
Allied Signal
Computer Sciences Corp
Curtiss-Wright Corporation
Emerson Electric
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51 Esterline Technologies 3823 Measuring and Control Equipment 14 39.4 45.0 40.0 33.4
52 E-Systems 3812 Electronic Equipment 6 81.8 91.1 78.3 76.9
53 Evans & Sutherland 3690 Electrical Equipment 3 59.7 75.2 53.8 50.2
54 Flir Systems 3812 Electronic Equipment 8 33.5 42.7 32.3 26.4
55 Fluor 1600 Construction 5 5.8 9.6 6.2 1.9
56 FMC 2800 Chemicals 7 25.7 29.8 27.2 20.5
57 Force Protection 3790 Automobiles and Trucks 2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
58 Ford Motor 3711 Automobiles and Trucks 2 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.7
59 3760 Defense 11 47.7 75.2 48.5 30.8
60 3714 Automobiles and Trucks 1 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7
61 3060 Rubber and Plastic Products 3 20.1 22.1 21.5 16.6
62 3721 Aircraft 3 81.6 83.6 81.5 79.8
63 3730 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 16 80.9 95.7 79.0 61.9
64 3790 Automobiles and Trucks 5 71.6 73.7 72.7 66.5
65 3600 Electrical Equipment 10 5.6 11.5 3.5 1.6
66 9997 14 2.1 3.0 2.1 1.2
67 General Motors 3711 Automobiles and Trucks 14 3.2 6.1 4.0 0.2
68 Goodrich 3728 Aircraft 12 25.8 31.9 27.0 8.0
69 Grumman 3721 Aircraft 5 79.0 85.0 80.9 72.4
70 GTE 4813 Communication 11 4.6 7.2 4.4 2.4
71 GTSI Corporation 5045 Wholesale 4 52.0 61.0 56.5 34.0
72 1389 Petroleum and Natural Gas 2 18.4 29.3 18.4 7.4
73 1600 Construction 3 26.4 32.1 28.8 18.5
74 3663 Electronic Equipment 19 31.5 45.9 33.0 18.0
75 3812 Electronic Equipment 5 52.9 61.5 51.2 47.8
76 3440 Construction Materials 2 24.7 29.6 24.7 19.8
77 3790 Automobiles and Trucks 3 44.9 54.6 47.6 32.5
78 Heico 3724 Aircraft 9 21.6 26.0 23.0 16.0
79 2821 Chemicals 4 23.1 25.9 23.0 20.5
80 2890 Chemicals 3 15.6 21.6 20.2 4.8
81 Herley Industries 3812 Electronic Equipment 7 85.3 95.3 95.0 61.0
82 HewlettPackard 3570 Computers 5 2.0 2.3 2.1 1.4
83 Hexcel 2821 Chemicals 8 22.4 27.0 22.4 18.0
84 Honeywell 3822 Measuring and Control Equipment 10 7.7 23.1 6.2 4.2
85 Honeywell International 3728 Aircraft 15 13.8 18.0 14.5 6.0
86 IBM 3570 Computers 6 1.9 2.6 2.1 0.2
87 ITT 6331 Insurance 5 6.3 7.9 5.9 4.3
88 ITT Corporation 3812 Electronic Equipment 5 41.8 44.2 42.7 36.4
89 3714 Automobiles and Trucks 4 9.9 12.5 11.5 4.2
90 3561 Machinery 8 32.0 43.0 30.5 27.6
91 Jacobs Engineering Group 1600 Construction 15 9.0 14.1 8.5 6.0
92 Kaman 5080 Wholesale 24 21.2 39.9 19.7 7.0
93 KBR 1623 Construction 4 27.2 41.2 28.2 11.1
94 Kratos Defense & Security Solutions 4899 Communication 3 63.0 77.6 59.3 52.0
95 L-3 Communications 3663 Electronic Equipment 13 80.5 88.6 81.8 70.4
96 LaBarge 3812 Electronic Equipment 7 43.4 47.9 45.0 37.0
97 Lear Siegler 2531 Business Supplies 3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
98 3812 Electronic Equipment 10 75.7 91.7 78.2 58.2
99 3730 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 1 70.6 70.6 70.6 70.6
100 7373 Computers 1 69.9 69.9 69.9 69.9
101 3760 Defense 22 71.6 78.3 71.0 60.4
102 3721 Aircraft 2 69.9 77.0 69.9 62.9
103 Logicon 7371 Business Services 8 91.4 96.1 92.5 84.8
104 Loral 3812 Electronic Equipment 6 91.4 93.5 90.9 90.0
105 Lucent Technologies 3661 Electronic Equipment 2 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.2
106 ManTech International 7373 Computers 9 94.7 96.6 95.0 91.8
107 Martin Marietta 3760 Defense 5 73.5 75.1 74.9 68.9
108 McDonnell Douglas 3721 Aircraft 8 63.0 70.0 64.4 53.4
109 3590 Machinery 7 34.6 47.0 30.5 25.7
110 3728 Aircraft 9 42.7 49.7 42.7 38.0
111 Morrison Knudsen 1540 Construction 6 13.1 21.6 12.1 5.5
112 Motorola 3663 Electronic Equipment 12 2.9 6.8 1.8 0.8
113 MTC Technologies 8711 Business Services 4 96.8 98.0 97.0 95.4
114 Nichols Research Corporation 8711 Business Services 4 58.6 69.3 56.0 53.0
115 3721 Aircraft 7 86.9 89.8 89.2 80.7
116 3812 Electronic Equipment 14 76.7 81.0 77.0 68.9
117 3728 Aircraft 3 68.1 73.5 66.7 64.0
118 2800 Chemicals 7 13.8 16.5 13.8 12.1
119 3350 Steel Works Etc 4 8.5 10.0 8.5 7.1
120 3760 Defense 7 44.4 54.0 44.0 36.0
121 3663 Electronic Equipment 3 42.7 54.0 39.0 35.0
122 Oshkosh Truck 3711 Automobiles and Trucks 24 46.5 72.0 45.3 19.1
123 Perot Systems 7373 Computers 5 8.4 11.5 7.4 6.3
124 3320 Steel Works Etc 5 18.5 22.5 18.5 13.0
125 3728 Aircraft 6 13.0 16.0 12.5 12.0
Gencorp
General Dynamics
General Electric
Halliburton
Harsco
Hercules
ITT Industries
Litton
Lockheed Martin
Precision Castparts
Harris
Moog
Northrop Grumman
Olin
Orbital Sciences Corporation
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126 Primex Technologies 3480 Defense 1 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6
127 Raytheon 3812 Electronic Equipment 24 66.4 92.8 67.0 33.8
128 3674 Electronic Equipment 1 34.6 34.6 34.6 34.6
129 3663 Electronic Equipment 4 27.3 31.7 27.4 22.9
130 Rockwell Collins 3728 Aircraft 10 54.0 61.3 52.7 49.6
131 3760 Defense 7 29.9 35.9 33.1 18.7
132 3620 Electrical Equipment 3 11.7 15.3 9.9 9.8
133 Rohr Industries 3728 Aircraft 8 17.0 29.7 14.1 8.0
134 Science Applications 7373 Computers 1 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0
135 Sequa 3724 Aircraft 18 12.9 34.2 10.0 2.0
136 Shaw Group 8711 Business Services 10 11.4 16.2 11.3 5.9
137 Silicon Graphics 3571 Computers 3 16.2 18.2 15.7 14.6
138 SRA International 7370 Business Services 7 51.7 58.9 50.0 48.0
139 3510 Machinery 2 19.8 24.3 19.8 15.3
140 5084 Wholesale 9 39.9 86.8 37.7 16.6
141 3728 Aircraft 8 21.5 28.4 21.9 15.2
142 3561 Machinery 2 16.1 16.5 16.1 15.8
143 Tech-Sym 3812 Electronic Equipment 2 67.6 75.6 67.6 59.7
144 Teledyne Technologies 3663 Electronic Equipment 11 37.5 43.8 38.0 29.0
145 3523 Machinery 6 15.2 17.2 14.6 14.0
146 3714 Automobiles and Trucks 1 18.7 18.7 18.7 18.7
147 Tetra Tech 8711 Business Services 11 22.1 33.7 22.8 6.2
148 Texas Instruments 3674 Electronic Equipment 9 21.7 33.1 21.6 7.7
149 3720 Aircraft 9 17.1 24.0 17.6 9.5
150 3721 Aircraft 9 21.9 29.0 24.0 11.4
151 9997 6 11.7 14.2 11.8 9.2
152 Thiokol 3760 Defense 9 40.8 56.4 43.3 22.4
153 Titan 7373 Computers 7 53.1 63.0 54.1 42.6
154 Tracor 3812 Electronic Equipment 3 77.5 80.8 78.1 73.6
155 Triumph Group 3728 Aircraft 5 34.0 37.0 36.3 27.8
156 3714 Automobiles and Trucks 12 27.9 36.5 29.3 17.6
157 3760 Defense 1 39.1 39.1 39.1 39.1
158 UNC 3724 Aircraft 3 40.7 52.2 39.6 30.3
159 3570 Computers 4 20.7 22.8 20.2 19.8
160 7370 Business Services 3 14.2 19.4 18.9 4.2
161 United Defense 3790 Automobiles and Trucks 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
162 United Industrial 3690 Electrical Equipment 15 85.2 97.0 85.5 74.8
163 3724 Aircraft 15 17.2 21.0 19.1 10.8
164 3720 Aircraft 9 18.5 21.6 18.0 16.0
165 URS Corporation 8711 Business Services 11 31.2 37.7 31.0 25.4
166 ViaSat 3663 Electronic Equipment 9 50.5 56.0 50.7 45.1
167 VSE Corporation 8711 Business Services 10 81.4 98.2 82.6 56.7
168 Washington Group International 8711 Business Services 2 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0
169 3585 Machinery 3 17.9 18.1 18.0 17.7
170 3812 Electronic Equipment 3 23.7 24.6 23.8 22.7
171 3510 Machinery 1 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5
172 4833 Communication 1 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6
3 Digit    2 Digit     FF 48    # of
 SICs       SICs     Groups   Firms
63     48         19          23       121 1165 40.5 35.0 28.5 0.43
Mean
Stewart & Stevenson
Rockwell International
Sundstrand
Tenneco
Textron
TRW
Unisys
United Technologies
Remec
Summary Values
Westinghouse Electric
Unique Observations Share Statistics
4 Digit 
SICs
Firm-
years
Median Std Dev
Skew 
ness
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Δ Δ Δ
Pre Post
200 134
> 7 < = 7
144 190
Local Federal Δ Δ Δ
Jan - Dec (All) 168 166 -2.50 0.482 -4.58 0.285 1.42 0.876
Aug - Oct 42 42 -8.77 0.306 -14.00 0.213 -32.27 0.091 *
Aug - Nov 56 55 -8.05 0.252 -13.08 0.155 -33.27 0.036 **
Aug - Nov 2% trunc 50 55 -9.83 0.165 -17.37 0.046 ** -44.71 0.000 ***
Mid-term President Δ Δ Δ
Aug - Oct 21 21 0.32 0.978 -3.27 0.824 26.41 0.224
Aug - Nov 28 27 0.53 0.956 -2.60 0.834 25.12 0.198
Table III: National Security and War Uncertainty
Table III presents the Baker et al. (2013) monthly national security & war uncertainty from January 1985 thru October
2012 from. Policy is the overall economic policy uncertainty index value. News-based is the uncertainty component from
10 large US newspapers and comprises 50% of the overall economic policy uncertainty index. National Security is the
uncertainty component from newspapers that specifically relates to national security or war. Panel A presents uncertainty
metrics by periods to show how uncertainty changes. Differences are shown for the events of September 11th, 2001 and
catastrophic threat based on the Doomsday Clock positioned at 7 minutes or less to midnight. Panel B presents differences
between local elections and US federal elections. Panel C provides differences between mid-term elections and
presidential elections. All t-statistics are calculated using the Satterthwaite method for unequal variances. The 2%
truncated values drop the six highest and six lowest values of the national security and war index. Significance levels are
indicated:  *** @ 1%, ** @ 5%, and * @ 10%.
Panel A: Differences between periods (pre - post)
-9.67
p value p value p value
Classification # Observations
9 / 11 -20.15 0.000 *** -22.98
Policy Index News-based Index
Months
# Observations
Panel B: Differences between election categories (local - federal)
2.92 0.759Doomsday clock -18.71 0.000 *** -6.90 0.101
p value p value p value
Panel C: Differences between election categories (presidential - mid-term)
Months
# Observations National Security Index
National Security Index
Policy Index News-based Index National Security Index
Policy Index News-based Index
p value p value p value
0.000 ***0.000 ***
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1st 
Quartile 
Min
SIPRI
Table IV: Descriptive Statistics
Table IV presents the summary descriptive statistics of the US public military contractor sample firms from 1989
through 2012. The variables Rank and Share are from the SIPRI database. Rank indicates the standing of a military
contractor on a global basis as determined by the dollar value of sales to the military. Share is the percentage of arms
sales to total sales of the firm. Compustat variables include: Operating Income Before Depreciation (OIBDP) is divided
by both SALE and AT to produce these variables, Cash Flow per Sales is Operating Cash Flow (OANCF)/SALE,
capital expenditure and research & development to assets ratio (CERDATR) is (CAPX + XRD)/AT, Return on Equity
(ROE) is NI/CEQ, Return on Assets (ROA) is NI/AT, and Profit Margin is NI/SALE. Simple Tobin’s Q (M/B) is
MKVALT/AT, the Tobin’s Q (Chung) follows the Chung and Pruitt (1994) method, and leverage is (DLTT +
DD1)/AT. 
Source
# 
Obs
Variables Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Max
3rd 
Quartile 
Median
1165 Rank 82.6 52.9 1 38 77 123 214
1165 Share 40.5% 28.5% 100.0% 63.6% 35.0% 16.0% 0.16%
C
o
m
p
u
s
t
a
t
1165 OIBDP/Assets 12.6% 5.3% 34.8% 16.0% 12.5% 9.8% -24.76%
1165 OIBDP/Sales 12.1% 6.5% 44.7% 14.3% 11.6% 8.7% -16.90%
1165 Cash Flow/Sales 7.7% 6.0% 36.1% 10.4% 7.7% 4.6% -14.44%
940 CERDATR 7.6% 5.1% 34.7% 9.9% 6.2% 4.1% 0.75%
1165 ROE 16.2% 209.0% 7038.5% 18.6% 12.4% 6.9% -604.95%
1165 ROA 4.2% 6.1% 38.0% 7.1% 4.9% 2.4% -45.10%
1165 Profit Margin 3.9% 6.2% 44.0% 6.3% 4.2% 2.2% -79.76%
1036 Tobin's Q (M/B) 0.92 0.61 5.56 1.16 0.77 0.51 0.04
639 Tobin's Q (Chung) 1.04 0.50 4.46 1.25 0.94 0.71 0.14
1144 Leverage 0.19 0.13 0.59 0.28 0.18 0.10 0.00
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α 0.0003 0.0010 0.79 0.0060 0.0008 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0051
β 0.93 0.39 0.34 2.62 1.17 0.92 0.64 -0.30
γ 0 0.00018 0.00026 3.37 0.00215 0.00023 0.00009 0.00003 0.00000
γ 1 0.45 0.35 -0.02 1.00 0.79 0.48 0.05 0.00
γ 2 0.18 0.18 2.29 1.00 0.24 0.13 0.07 0.00
ε 0.0003 0.0229 0.73 0.4550 0.0092 -0.0003 -0.0096 -0.5044
h 0.0007 0.0023 31.14 0.2008 0.0006 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000
Q 1.25 5.66 39.02 554.37 0.99 0.27 0.05 0.00
Panel B: Abnormal Return and Volatility in Event Period (-40, 40)
Skewness
1st 
Quartile 
MinVariable Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Max
3rd 
Quartile 
Median
Panel A: GARCH (1, 1) Parameters
Table V: Summary of GARCH (1,1) Parameters and Output
Table V provides summary information for the parameters and output produced by the GARCH (1, 
1) model. Panel A presents the GARCH (1, 1) parameters as determined during the estimation period 
(-540, -41). From equation 1, α provides the idiosyncratic component of returns while β indicates the 
systematic component. From equation 2, γ0 indicates the minimum conditional variance, γ1 is the 
coefficient for the lagged conditional variance, and γ2 is the coefficient for the lagged squared 
abnormal return. Panel B presents summary information on the daily output during the event period 
(-40, 40). From equation 1, ε is the abnormal component of returns while h is the conditional 
variance of abnormal returns. From equation 5,    provides a measure of the firm-level daily 
volatility. 
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APPENDIX C – RESULTS TABLES 
 
Election 
Firm-years
Daily
(n1, n2)
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
(-2, 2) 0.446   8.9% 2.140 * 42.8% 3.408 ** 68.2% 0.902   18.0% 0.993   19.9% 1.525   30.5%
(-5, 5) 1.942   17.7% 5.029 ** 45.7% 7.246 *** 65.9% 2.874 * 26.1% 3.150 * 28.6% 3.672 ** 33.4%
(-10, 10) 5.983 ** 28.5% 9.947 *** 47.4% 12.516 *** 59.6% 7.493 *** 35.7% 8.963 *** 42.7% 6.759 ** 32.2%
(-25, 25) 7.543 ** 14.8% 22.073 *** 43.3% 27.923 *** 54.8% 16.492 *** 32.3% 21.107 *** 41.4% 8.242 ** 16.2%
(-40, 40) 8.725 ** 10.8% 28.250 *** 34.9% 34.698 *** 42.8% 22.194 *** 27.4% 29.243 *** 36.1% 11.764 ** 14.5%
(0, 2) 0.127   4.2% 1.366 * 45.5% 2.494 ** 83.1% 0.256   8.5% 0.330   11.0% 1.093   36.4%
(0, 5) 0.298   5.0% 1.476   24.6% 2.440 * 40.7% 0.540   9.0% 0.925   15.4% 0.865   14.4%
(0, 10) 1.888   17.2% 2.910 * 26.5% 4.359 ** 39.6% 1.513   13.8% 3.348 * 30.4% 1.361   12.4%
(0, 25) 2.145   8.3% 6.331 ** 24.4% 10.735 *** 41.3% 2.053   7.9% 7.052 ** 27.1% 1.027   3.9%
(0, 40) 2.638   6.4% 8.339 ** 20.3% 15.100 *** 36.8% 1.770   4.3% 12.200 *** 29.8% -1.855   -4.5%
(-2, 0) 0.263   8.8% 1.352 * 45.1% 1.930 ** 64.3% 0.790   26.3% 0.756   25.2% 0.855   28.5%
(-5, 0) 1.587   26.4% 4.131 ** 68.8% 5.823 *** 97.1% 2.478 * 41.3% 2.318 * 38.6% 3.230 ** 53.8%
(-10, 0) 4.037 ** 36.7% 7.615 *** 69.2% 9.174 *** 83.4% 6.125 *** 55.7% 5.708 ** 51.9% 5.822 *** 52.9%
(-25, 0) 5.340 ** 20.5% 16.319 *** 62.8% 18.205 *** 70.0% 14.584 *** 56.1% 14.148 *** 54.4% 7.639 ** 29.4%
(-40, 0) 6.030 ** 14.7% 20.488 *** 50.0% 20.614 *** 50.3% 20.568 *** 50.2% 17.135 *** 41.8% 14.042 *** 34.2%
CAV by Period
Presidential Mid-term Pre 9/11 Post 9/11
Panel A: Observations for Election Category
Table VI presents cumulative abnormal volatility (CAV) for the 1165 firm-election observations of military contractors. Event windows (n1, n2) are identified by days
relative to the election date. Local elections include all odd year elections except for 2001 due to the confounding event of September 11th 2001. Federal elections
include all even year elections. Presidential elections include each year with a candidate for president and Mid-term elections include each federal election year
without a presidential candidate. Pre 9/11 includes all types of elections from 1989 through 2000, while post 9/11 includes all types of elections from 2001 through
2012. Panel A provides descriptive information about each election category. Election is the number of events in each election category. Firm-years gives the
cumulative number of firm observations in each election category. Daily is the total number of daily volatility values (Q) used to construct the election category
volatility measure (M) and calculate CAV for the (-40, 40) window. Panel B provides the symmetric event periods around the election date. Panel C provides the
asymmetric event periods following the election date. Panel D provides the asymmetric event periods prior to the election date. CAV values are reported along with
significance levels based on bootstrapped distributions which exclude September 17th 2001. Significance levels for election categories are based on critical values
presented in figure 14. Significance levels are indicated:  *** @ 1%, ** @ 5%, and * @ 10%.
Table VI: Cumulative Abnormal Volatility
Panel B: Symmetric event windows
Panel C: Post-election event windows
Panel D: Pre-election event windows
Local no '01 Federal
Window    
(n1, n2)
11
538
43578
12
587
47547
6
293
23733
All Elections CAV Federal Elections CAV
12
595
48195
CAV CAV CAV CAV CAV CAV
6
294
23814
12
570
46170
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(n1, n2)
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
(-2, 2) 1.694   33.9% 2.506   50.1% 2.961   59.2% 0.455   9.1% 0.532   10.6%
(-5, 5) 3.087   28.1% 4.372   39.7% 5.304 * 48.2% 0.932   8.5% 0.522   4.7%
(-10, 10) 3.965   18.9% 5.023   23.9% 6.534   31.1% 1.510   7.2% -2.204   -10.5%
(-25, 25) 14.530 ** 28.5% 11.431 * 22.4% 20.381 *** 40.0% 8.949   17.5% -12.865 ** -25.2%
(-40, 40) 19.525 ** 24.1% 12.504   15.4% 25.973 *** 32.1% 13.469 * 16.6% -17.479 ** -21.6%
(0, 2) 1.239   41.3% 2.238   74.6% 2.368   78.9% 0.130   4.3% 0.764   25.5%
(0, 5) 1.177   19.6% 1.899   31.7% 2.141   35.7% 0.242   4.0% -0.060   -1.0%
(0, 10) 1.022   9.3% 2.847   25.9% 2.471   22.5% -0.375   -3.4% -1.987   -18.1%
(0, 25) 4.186   16.1% 8.683 * 33.4% 8.590 * 33.0% -0.093   -0.4% -6.025   -23.2%
(0, 40) 5.701   13.9% 13.330 ** 32.5% 12.462 ** 30.4% -0.868   -2.1% -14.055 ** -34.3%
(-2, 0) 1.089   36.3% 1.141   38.0% 1.668   55.6% 0.527   17.6% 0.099   3.3%
(-5, 0) 2.544   42.4% 3.345   55.8% 4.237   70.6% 0.891   14.9% 0.913   15.2%
(-10, 0) 3.577   32.5% 3.049   27.7% 5.136   46.7% 2.087   19.0% 0.114   1.0%
(-25, 0) 10.979 ** 42.2% 3.620   13.9% 12.864 ** 49.5% 9.244 * 35.6% -6.509   -25.0%
(-40, 0) 14.458 ** 35.3% 0.046   0.1% 14.585 ** 35.6% 14.538 ** 35.5% -3.093   -7.5%
Table VII presents cumulative abnormal volatility (CAV) differences between election categories. Event windows (n1, n2) are identified by
days relative to the election date. Local elections include all odd year elections except for 2001 due to the confounding event of September 11th
2001. Federal elections include all even year elections. Presidential elections include each year with a candidate for president and Mid-term
elections include each federal election year without a presidential candidate. Pre 9/11 includes all types of elections from 1989 through 2000,
while post 9/11 includes all types of elections from 2001 through 2012. Panel A provides the symmetric event periods around the election date.
Panel B provides the asymmetric event periods following the election date. Panel C provides the asymmetric event periods prior to the election
date. The CAV differences are reported along with significance levels based on bootstrapped distributions which exclude September 17th 2001.
Significance levels for the CAV differences between election categories are based on the critical values displayed in figure 15. Significance
levels are indicated:  *** @ 1%, ** @ 5%, and * @ 10%.
Table VII: Cumulative Abnormal Volatility Differences
Federal - Local no '01 Presidential - Mid-term
Presidential - Local no 
'01
Mid-term - Local no 
'01
Panel A: Symmetric event windows
Panel B: Post-election event windows
Panel C: Pre-election event windows
Post 9/11 - Pre 9/11
CAV CAV CAV CAV CAV
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V
ariable
Y
ears
Firm
-years
D
aily
Index
(n
1 , n
2 )
Im
plied 
%
Δ
Im
plied 
%
Δ
Im
plied 
%
Δ
Im
plied 
%
Δ
Im
plied 
%
Δ
Im
plied 
%
Δ
Im
plied 
%
Δ
Im
plied 
%
Δ
(-2, 2)
8.175
***
163.5%
0.691
  
13.8%
8.245
***
164.9%
0.937
  
18.7%
3.803
**
76.1%
1.094
  
21.9%
-1.287
  
-25.7%
1.722
*
34.4%
(-5, 5)
20.168
***
183.3%
0.516
  
4.7%
20.066
***
182.4%
0.891
  
8.1%
9.893
***
89.9%
1.867
  
17.0%
-2.468
  
-22.4%
4.975
**
45.2%
(-10, 10)
39.563
***
188.4%
0.535
  
2.5%
38.050
***
181.2%
1.356
  
6.5%
21.887
***
104.2%
4.279
*
20.4%
-3.874
  
-18.4%
11.163
***
53.2%
(-25, 25)
87.058
***
170.7%
2.561
  
5.0%
87.944
***
172.4%
11.441
***
22.4%
48.260
***
94.6%
12.545
***
24.6%
-8.740
  
-17.1%
14.011
***
27.5%
(-40, 40)
114.879
***
141.8%
6.014
*
7.4%
107.962
***
133.3%
22.001
***
27.2%
71.408
***
88.2%
17.115
***
21.1%
-13.575
  
-16.8%
20.887
***
25.8%
(0, 2)
5.663
***
188.8%
0.239
  
8.0%
6.404
***
213.5%
0.226
  
7.5%
1.743
*
58.1%
0.362
  
12.1%
-0.648
  
-21.6%
0.868
  
28.9%
(0, 5)
7.406
***
123.4%
-0.619
  
-10.3%
7.144
***
119.1%
-0.204
  
-3.4%
3.608
**
60.1%
-0.557
  
-9.3%
-1.426
  
-23.8%
1.857
*
31.0%
(0, 10)
15.296
***
139.1%
-1.279
  
-11.6%
13.927
***
126.6%
-0.169
  
-1.5%
8.744
***
79.5%
-1.187
  
-10.8%
-2.507
  
-22.8%
5.079
**
46.2%
(0, 25)
32.944
***
126.7%
-2.857
  
-11.0%
38.601
***
148.5%
2.039
  
7.8%
14.266
***
54.9%
-1.991
  
-7.7%
-4.679
  
-18.0%
6.688
**
25.7%
(0, 40)
42.781
***
104.3%
0.815
  
2.0%
50.689
***
123.6%
10.878
***
26.5%
18.510
***
45.1%
-1.002
  
-2.4%
-6.469
  
-15.8%
13.943
***
34.0%
(-2, 0)
4.666
***
155.5%
0.683
  
22.8%
4.141
***
138.0%
0.911
  
30.4%
2.792
**
93.1%
0.888
  
29.6%
-0.854
  
-28.5%
1.106
  
36.9%
(-5, 0)
14.916
***
248.6%
1.365
  
22.8%
15.223
***
253.7%
1.295
  
21.6%
7.017
***
117.0%
2.581
**
43.0%
-1.256
  
-20.9%
3.371
**
56.2%
(-10, 0)
26.420
***
240.2%
2.044
  
18.6%
26.423
***
240.2%
1.725
  
15.7%
13.875
***
126.1%
5.622
**
51.1%
-1.582
  
-14.4%
6.338
***
57.6%
(-25, 0)
56.267
***
216.4%
5.648
**
21.7%
51.643
***
198.6%
9.602
***
36.9%
34.727
***
133.6%
14.692
***
56.5%
-4.275
  
-16.4%
7.576
**
29.1%
(-40, 0)
74.252
***
181.1%
5.429
*
13.2%
59.573
***
145.3%
11.322
***
27.6%
53.631
***
130.8%
18.273
***
44.6%
-7.321
  
-17.9%
7.197
**
17.6%
O
bservations
10.88
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V
C
A
V
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uartile
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P
residential Q
uartile
M
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1st
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(n1, n2)
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
(-2, 2) 7.483 *** 149.7% 7.308 *** 146.2% 2.708   54.2% -3.009   -60.2%
(-5, 5) 19.652 *** 178.7% 19.176 *** 174.3% 8.025 ** 73.0% -7.442 ** -67.7%
(-10, 10) 39.027 *** 185.8% 36.694 *** 174.7% 17.608 *** 83.8% -15.037 *** -71.6%
(-25, 25) 84.497 *** 165.7% 76.503 *** 150.0% 35.715 *** 70.0% -22.750 *** -44.6%
(-40, 40) 108.865 *** 134.4% 85.961 *** 106.1% 54.293 *** 67.0% -34.462 *** -42.5%
(0, 2) 5.424 *** 180.8% 6.178 *** 205.9% 1.381   46.0% -1.517   -50.6%
(0, 5) 8.026 *** 133.8% 7.349 *** 122.5% 4.166 * 69.4% -3.283   -54.7%
(0, 10) 16.575 *** 150.7% 14.096 *** 128.1% 9.931 *** 90.3% -7.585 ** -69.0%
(0, 25) 35.801 *** 137.7% 36.562 *** 140.6% 16.257 *** 62.5% -11.367 ** -43.7%
(0, 40) 41.965 *** 102.4% 39.811 *** 97.1% 19.512 *** 47.6% -20.412 *** -49.8%
(-2, 0) 3.983   132.8% 3.230   107.7% 1.905   63.5% -1.960   -65.3%
(-5, 0) 13.550 *** 225.8% 13.928 *** 232.1% 4.437   73.9% -4.627   -77.1%
(-10, 0) 24.376 *** 221.6% 24.698 *** 224.5% 8.254 ** 75.0% -7.919 ** -72.0%
(-25, 0) 50.619 *** 194.7% 42.041 *** 161.7% 20.035 *** 77.1% -11.851 ** -45.6%
(-40, 0) 68.823 *** 167.9% 48.251 *** 117.7% 35.358 *** 86.2% -14.518 ** -35.4%
Panel B: Post-election windows
Panel C: Pre-election event windows
Panel A: Symmetric event windows
Table IX: Cumulative Abnormal Volatility Differences by Uncertainty Index
Table IX presents cumulative abnormal volatility (CAV) differences between the top (1st) and bottom (4th) quartiles 
of the September national security and war uncertainty index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013). Index is the
September national security and war uncertainty index value of top and bottom quartiles. Panels A-C and the CAV
differences are consistent with the information in Table VI. Significance levels are indicated: *** @ 1%, ** @ 5%,
and * @ 10%.
CAV CAV CAV CAV
Top vs. 
bottom
Δ Federal = 21.41 Δ Presidential = 19.55 Δ Mid-term = 31.69 Δ Local no '01 = 15.91
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Δ
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%
Δ
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(-2, 2)
1.672
*
33.4%
3.057
**
61.1%
2.137
*
42.7%
4.702
***
94.0%
1.226
  
24.5%
1.465
  
29.3%
-0.263
  
-5.3%
0.970
  
19.4%
(-5, 5)
3.924
**
35.7%
6.252
***
56.8%
3.967
**
36.1%
7.534
***
68.5%
3.975
**
36.1%
5.121
**
46.6%
-0.288
  
-2.6%
3.420
**
31.1%
(-10, 10)
9.471
***
45.1%
11.047
***
52.6%
10.596
***
50.5%
12.857
***
61.2%
8.495
***
40.5%
9.624
***
45.8%
2.792
  
13.3%
8.366
***
39.8%
(-25, 25)
20.645
***
40.5%
32.758
***
64.2%
29.160
***
57.2%
33.950
***
66.6%
12.992
***
25.5%
34.460
***
67.6%
3.326
  
6.5%
12.993
***
25.5%
(-40, 40)
23.364
***
28.8%
46.771
***
57.7%
35.324
***
43.6%
45.265
***
55.9%
12.681
***
15.7%
51.820
***
64.0%
1.223
  
1.5%
16.313
***
20.1%
(0, 2)
0.493
  
16.4%
1.810
*
60.3%
0.523
  
17.4%
3.447
**
114.9%
0.471
  
15.7%
0.186
  
6.2%
-0.598
  
-19.9%
0.348
  
11.6%
(0, 5)
0.657
  
10.9%
2.519
*
42.0%
0.109
  
1.8%
3.710
**
61.8%
1.261
  
21.0%
1.354
  
22.6%
-0.757
  
-12.6%
0.994
  
16.6%
(0, 10)
2.819
*
25.6%
4.462
**
40.6%
3.309
*
30.1%
6.276
***
57.1%
2.404
*
21.9%
2.682
*
24.4%
1.235
  
11.2%
2.665
*
24.2%
(0, 25)
4.691
*
18.0%
9.998
***
38.5%
9.837
***
37.8%
13.212
***
50.8%
0.059
  
0.2%
8.754
***
33.7%
2.869
  
11.0%
3.869
*
14.9%
(0, 40)
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*
13.2%
15.038
***
36.7%
13.647
***
33.3%
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***
49.3%
-1.966
  
-4.8%
12.058
***
29.4%
2.877
  
7.0%
6.337
**
15.5%
(-2, 0)
1.305
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43.5%
2.616
**
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52.9%
4.004
***
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(n1, n2)
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
Implied 
%Δ
(-2, 2) -1.384   -27.7% -2.565   -51.3% -0.239   -4.8% -1.233   -24.7%
(-5, 5) -2.328   -21.2% -3.567   -32.4% -1.146   -10.4% -3.709   -33.7%
(-10, 10) -1.576   -7.5% -2.261   -10.8% -1.128   -5.4% -5.575   -26.5%
(-25, 25) -12.113 * -23.8% -4.790   -9.4% -21.468 *** -42.1% -9.667   -19.0%
(-40, 40) -23.407 *** -28.9% -9.941   -12.3% -39.139 *** -48.3% -15.089 * -18.6%
(0, 2) -1.317   -43.9% -2.923 ** -97.4% 0.285   9.5% -0.945   -31.5%
(0, 5) -1.862   -31.0% -3.600 * -60.0% -0.093   -1.6% -1.751   -29.2%
(0, 10) -1.643   -14.9% -2.967   -27.0% -0.278   -2.5% -1.430   -13.0%
(0, 25) -5.308   -20.4% -3.374   -13.0% -8.695 * -33.4% -1.000   -3.8%
(0, 40) -9.620 * -23.5% -6.557   -16.0% -14.024 ** -34.2% -3.460   -8.4%
(-2, 0) -1.311   -43.7% -2.417   -80.6% -0.236   -7.9% -0.432   -14.4%
(-5, 0) -1.710   -28.5% -2.743   -45.7% -0.764   -12.7% -2.103   -35.0%
(-10, 0) -1.177   -10.7% -2.070   -18.8% -0.562   -5.1% -4.289   -39.0%
(-25, 0) -8.050   -31.0% -4.191   -16.1% -12.485 ** -48.0% -8.812 * -33.9%
(-40, 0) -15.031 ** -36.7% -6.160   -15.0% -24.826 *** -60.6% -11.774 * -28.7%
Δ Fed = 47.21 Δ Pres= 47.18 Δ Mid= 47.64 Δ Local = 48.00
Panel B: Post-election windows
Table XI: Cumulative Abnormal Volatility Differences by Share
Table XI presents cumulative abnormal volatility (CAV) differences between the top (1st) and bottom (4th) quartiles of
share of sales to the military. Share is the top and bottom quartiles percentage of arms sales to total sales of the firm from
SIPRI. Panels A-C and the CAV differences are consistent with the information in Table IX. Significance levels are
indicated:  *** @ 1%, ** @ 5%, and * @ 10%.
CAV CAV CAV CAV
Panel C: Pre-election event windows
Panel A: Symmetric event windows
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mean M 1.106 *** 1.349 *** 1.427 *** 1.276 *** 1.361 *** 1.143 **
median M 1.060 *** 1.312 *** 1.322 *** 1.192 *** 1.353 *** 1.009   
mean M 1.143 *** 1.500 *** 1.501 *** 1.505 *** 1.418 *** 1.339 ***
median M 1.046 ** 1.488 *** 1.380 *** 1.498 *** 1.434 *** 1.167 ***
mean M 1.067 * 1.194 *** 1.352 *** 1.041   1.303 *** 0.943   
median M 1.068   1.173 *** 1.249 *** 1.041   1.334 *** 0.916 **
αpre + βpre(n1) 0.936   1.172 * 1.003   1.344 *** 1.126   1.336   
βpre 0.010 ** 0.016 *** 0.025 *** 0.008   0.015 *** 0.000   
αpre 1.350 *** 1.829 *** 1.999 *** 1.666 *** 1.709 *** 1.341   
αpost 1.130   1.309 *** 1.497 *** 1.127 * 1.261 *** 1.167 **
βpost -0.003   -0.006   -0.007   -0.004   0.002   -0.011 ***
αpost + βpost(n2) 1.004   1.079   1.207   0.954   1.344 *** 0.719 ***
Adjusted R
2 0.087   0.361 0.167 0.362 0.219 0.108
Table XII presents the average election category volatility measure (6) and volatility models (10) around
elections for the 1165 military contractor firm-year observations. Event windows (n1, n2) are identified by
days relative to the election. Local elections include all odd year elections except for 2001 due to the
confounding event of September 11th 2001. Federal elections include all even year elections. Presidential
elections include each year with a candidate for president and Mid-term elections include each federal
election year without a presidential candidate. Pre 9/11 includes all types of elections from 1989 through
2000, while post 9/11 includes all types of elections from 2001 through 2012. Panel A provides the mean
and median election category volatility measures (6) for the full event window (-40, 40), pre-election (-40,
0) and post-election (0, 40) windows. The significance of mean values is reported using the t-test while
median values use the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Panel B provides the election category volatility model
(10) parameters. The significance of model parameters is reported using the t-test. The adjusted R2 value
indicates the overall fit of the volatility model. Significance levels are indicated:  *** @ 1%, ** @ 5%, and 
* @ 10%.
All ElectionsWindow    
(n1, n2) Local no '01 Federal Presidential Mid-term Pre 9/11 Post 9/11
Table XII: Volatility Models by Election Category
(-40, 0)
(1, 40)
Variable
(-40, 40)
(-40, 0)
(1, 40)
Panel A: Average Volatility
Federal Elections Period
Panel B: Models of Volatility
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APPENDIX E – ROBUSTNESS TABLES 
 
Leverage 8.29   -34.12   -73.36   -16.63   -17.30   -10.96   
ROA -67.11   47.61   126.21   -65.04   -66.59   138.82 **
Tobins_Q 10.63 * -31.57 *** -34.65 *** -41.63 *** 0.27   -16.61 **
Size 3.01 ** 5.02 *** 1.93   5.21 *** 1.69   1.18   
Index -1.33 *** 0.66 *** 2.45 *** 0.50 ** 1.09 *** 0.49 ***
F value 3.88 *** 14.24 *** 10.60 *** 8.52 *** 18.67 *** 5.87 ***
Adjusted R
2
Table XIII: Volatility Regressions Including Uncertainty Index
Table XIII presents average volatility models (9) using firm-election level daily volatility
measures (5) over the event window (-40, 40). A non-negative intercept constraint is imposed
to ensure that each firm-election volatility model is valid. Local elections include all odd year
elections except for 2001 due to the confounding event of September 11th 2001. Federal
elections include all even year elections. Presidential elections include each year with a
candidate for president and Mid-term elections include each federal election year without a
presidential candidate. Pre 9/11 includes all types of elections from 1989 through 2000, while
post 9/11 includes all types of elections from 2001 through 2012. Compustat variables include:
Leverage is (DLTT + DD1)/AT, Return on Assets (ROA) is NI/AT, Tobin’s Q is
MKVALT/AT, and Size is the natural log of assets (AT). Index is the September national
security and war uncertainty index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013). The significance of
mean values is reported using the t-test. Significance levels are indicated: *** @ 1%, ** @
5%, and * @ 10%.
Variable
All Elections Federal Elections Period
Local no '01 Federal Presidential
0.030 0.113 0.157 0.126 0.169
Mid-term Pre 9/11 Post 9/11
0.040
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Leverage -6.39   18.55   -16.18   26.37   -36.17   18.49   
ROA -113.67 ** -106.88   -47.45   -167.56   -159.54 ** -42.84   
Tobins_Q 13.19   -2.44   -16.59 ** 2.37   -0.53   4.87   
Size 2.89 ** 13.30 *** 5.66 *** 13.56 *** 4.77 *** 7.49 ***
Share -0.03   0.12   -0.12   0.07   -0.06   -0.09   
F value 6.63 *** 28.20 *** 27.29 *** 15.62 *** 23.50 *** 4.17 ***
Adjusted R
2
Table XIV: Volatility Regressions Including Share
Table XIV presents average volatility models (9) using firm-election level daily volatility measures
(5) over the event window (-40, 40). These models are run for each firm-year observation with a
non-negative intercept constraint imposed. Local elections include all odd year elections except for 
2001 due to the confounding event of September 11th 2001. Federal elections include all even
year elections. Presidential elections include each year with a candidate for president and Mid-
term elections include each federal election year without a presidential candidate. Pre 9/11
includes all types of elections from 1989 through 2000, while post 9/11 includes all types of
elections from 2001 through 2012. Compustat variables include: Leverage is (DLTT + DD1)/AT,
Return on Assets (ROA) is NI/AT, Tobin’s Q is MKVALT/AT, and Size is the natural log of
assets (AT). Share is the percentage of arms sales to total sales of the firm. Yearly dummy
variables are included in the regression but these results are not reported in the table. The
significance of mean values is reported using the t-test. Significance levels are indicated: *** @
1%, ** @ 5%, and * @ 10%.
Variable
All Elections Federal Elections Period
0.080
Local no '01 Federal Presidential Mid-term Pre 9/11 Post 9/11
0.155 0.457 0.506 0.360 0.382
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αpre + βpre(n1) 0.960   1.207 ** 1.067   1.347 ** 1.142 ** 1.338 **
βpre 0.010 *** 0.015 *** 0.022 *** 0.008 * 0.014 *** 0.003   
αpre 1.365 *** 1.825 *** 1.966 *** 1.684 *** 1.701 *** 1.441 ***
αpost 1.132 ** 1.296 *** 1.473 *** 1.119 * 1.262 *** 1.155 **
βpost -0.003   -0.004 * -0.005   -0.003   0.002   -0.010 ***
αpost + βpost(n2) 1.027   1.119 * 1.257 ** 0.982   1.360 *** 0.764 ***
0.047 0.048 0.046 0.049 0.044 0.054
αpre + βpre(n1) 0.651 *** 0.779 *** 0.781 ** 0.758   0.780 *** 0.656 ***
βpre 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.006 *** 0.002 *** 0.006 *** 0.001 ***
αpre 0.887 * 1.007 *** 0.992 *** 1.041 *** 1.117 *** 0.712   
αpost 0.735 *** 0.801   0.837   0.748 * 0.919   0.644 ***
βpost -0.001 * -0.003 *** -0.002 * -0.004 *** 0.001   -0.005 ***
αpost + βpost(n2) 0.678 *** 0.647 *** 0.674   0.598 *** 1.025 *** 0.350 ***
0.019 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.019 0.021
βpre(n1) 0.413 ** 0.656 *** 0.992 *** 0.322   0.582 *** 0.006   
αpost - αpre -0.219 ** -0.519 *** -0.500 *** -0.537 *** -0.447 *** -0.174   
βpost(n2) -0.126   -0.230 ** -0.288   -0.173   0.083   -0.448 ***
βpre(n1) 0.182 *** 0.155 *** 0.234 *** 0.069 *** 0.221 *** 0.035 ***
αpost - αpre -0.124 *** -0.165 *** -0.060 *** -0.202 *** -0.193 *** -0.051 ***
βpost(n2) -0.061 * -0.128 *** -0.097 * -0.149 *** 0.037   -0.190 ***
Median Adjusted R
2
Panel C: Volatility profile parameters
(1, 40)
Panel B: Median model values for Q by firm and year
(-40, 0)
(1, 40)
Mean Adjusted R
2
mean         
Δ Q
median              
Δ Q
(-40, 0)
Mid-term Pre 9/11 Post 9/11
Panel A: Mean model values for Q by firm and year
Table XV: Volatility Models by Firm-Election
Table XV presents average volatility models (10) using firm-election level volatility measures (5) over the event
window (-40, 40). A non-negative intercept constraint is imposed to ensure that each firm-election volatility model
is valid. Event windows (n1, n2) are identified by days relative to the election. Local elections include all odd year
elections except for 2001. Federal elections include all even year elections. Presidential elections include each year
with a candidate for president and Mid-term elections include each federal election year without a presidential
candidate. Pre 9/11 includes all types of elections from 1989 through 2000, while post 9/11 includes all types of
elections from 2001 through 2012. Panel A provides the mean volatility model parameters with significance
reported using the t-test. Panel B provides the median volatility model parameters with significance reported using
the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Panel C presents volatility trends as shown in the hypothesis tests. Significance
levels are indicated:  *** @ 1%, ** @ 5%, and * @ 10%.
Window    
(n1, n2)
Variable
All Elections Federal Elections Period
Local no '01 Federal Presidential
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APPENDIX F – OUTLINE OF SAS CODE 
* ELECTIONS AND ASSET PRICING: The Politically Sensitive Equity of US Military Contractors ; 
* This code identifies the sample firms and gets data for the military contractors ; 
* Compustat provides only firms with positive CEQ   ; 
* CRSP provides only firms with a full estimation period and daily returns thru the election day ; 
* Some output is produced in excel format for figure 1  ; 
 
libname sas "C:\Documents and Settings\ej1095\Desktop\Data_3FEB14\SAS" ; 
 
data elec_dates; 
 
%let wrds=wrds.wharton.upenn.edu 4016; 
options comamid=TCP remote=WRDS; 
signon username=_prompt_; 
 
rsubmit; 
libname comp '/wrds/comp/sasdata/nam';  * Access annual firm data from compustat ; 
data temp1;  
endrsubmit;  
 
rsubmit; 
proc upload data=elec_dates out=elec_dates; 
endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
proc sql; 
data temp2;  
libname compm '/wrds/comp/sasdata/nam/company';  * Access annual firm data from compustat ; 
data temp3;  
proc sql; 
endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
proc download data = temp4 out = temp4 ; 
endrsubmit; 
 
data temp5;  
proc sort data = temp5 out = mil_firms_compustat ;  
data sas.mil_firms_compustat; 
data mil_firms; 
 
%let wrds=wrds.wharton.upenn.edu 4016; 
options comamid=TCP remote=WRDS; 
signon username=_prompt_; 
 
rsubmit; 
proc upload data = mil_firms out = mil_firms ; 
data e_dates ;  
endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
proc sort data = e_dates nodupkey;  
proc sql; 
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endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
proc sort data=temp1;  
data CRSP_firms;  
endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
proc sort data= mil_firms ;  
proc sort data=CRSP_firms ;  
endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
proc sql; 
proc sort data = elec_return ;  
endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
data return3;  
data event;  
proc sort data=event;  
data event;  
endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
%let window_b = -40; * begin event window period ; 
%let window_f = 40 ; * end event window period ; 
data event_2;  
endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
data return4;  
data return5;  
data return6 ;  
endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
data index;  
proc sort data=index;  
proc sort data= return6 ;  
data GARCH_data;  
endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
proc sort data= GARCH_data ;  
proc reg data = GARCH_data noprint outest=beta;  
data beta;  
data beta;  
endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
data GARCH_data_2 ;  
data GARCH_data_3 ;  
endrsubmit; 
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rsubmit; 
proc download data = GARCH_data_3 out = ar ; 
endrsubmit; 
 
data sas.ar_1165 ; 
 
rsubmit; 
data final_sample ;  
proc download data = final_sample   out = final_sample ;  
endrsubmit; 
 
proc univariate data = final_sample  noprint ;    
data weight_data ;  
proc sort data = weight_data nodupkey ;  
data weight_data_2 ; 
PROC EXPORT DATA= WORK.weight_data_2 
proc sort data = final_sample ;  
data final_sample_firms ;  
proc sql; 
 
rsubmit; 
proc upload data= final_firms out= final_firms ; 
endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
libname crspa '/wrds/crsp/sasdata/a_stock'; 
data all_firms ; 
proc sql;  
data names_sic ; 
proc sort data = names_sic ;  
endrsubmit; 
 
rsubmit; 
proc sort data = final_firms ;  
data names_firms2 ; 
proc download data= names_firms2 out=names_firms2 ; 
endrsubmit; 
 
data ff48; 
data ff48_missing; 
data ff48_missing2; 
data ff48; 
proc sql ;  
proc sort data = names_firmsff  ;  
data sas.names_89_12 ; 
 
* Next step is the code Table_2_3 to create data for tables 2 and 3 ; 
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* ELECTIONS AND ASSET PRICING: The Politically Sensitive Equity of US Military Contractors ; 
* This uses sample firms from Sample_89-12 to produce all the output for Tables 2 and 3 ; 
* This code only extracts data from the file sas.names_89_12 which comes from Sample_89_12.sas ; 
 
libname sas "C:\Documents and Settings\ej1095\Desktop\Data_3FEB14\SAS" ; 
 
data names_firmsff ;  
data sas.names_firmsff ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ; 
proc sort data = names2 ;  
proc sort data = names_firmsff ;  
data names3 ;  
proc sort data = names3 ;  
PROC EXPORT DATA= WORK.names3 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data share_stats  ; 
PROC EXPORT DATA= WORK.share_stats 
proc sql number ; 
data count_table2_ind_all ; 
PROC EXPORT DATA= WORK.count_table2_ind_all 
proc sort data = names_firmsff out = observations nodupkey ;  
proc sort data = names_firmsff out = observations nodupkey ;  
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_rank ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_arms_sales ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_share ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_at ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_sale ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_NI  ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_Tobins_Q ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_OIBDP_Assets ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_OIDBP_sales ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_Cash_flow_per_sales ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_ROE ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_ROA ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_Profit_margin ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_tobinsq_alt; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_OIATR ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_CERDATR ; 
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proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_leverage; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_ROE_2  ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_T_Q_2  ; 
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
data tableIII_A_lever_2  ; 
data Table3_A ;  
data sas.Table3_89_12 ; 
PROC EXPORT DATA= WORK.Table3_A  
proc sort data = names_firmsff ;  
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;     
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;     
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;      
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;      
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;     
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;      
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;       
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;     
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;     
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;       
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;     
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;       
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;    
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;     
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;     
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;     
proc univariate data = names_firmsff noprint ;     
data Table3_A_time_series ;  
data sas.Table3_yr_89_12 ; 
PROC EXPORT DATA= WORK.Table3_A_time_series 
proc sql number ; 
PROC EXPORT DATA= WORK.count_figure5 
 
* completes calculations for tables 2 and 3 ; 
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* ELECTIONS AND ASSET PRICING: The Politically Sensitive Equity of US Military Contractors ; 
* Produces abnormal returns and raw data for GARCH modeling  ; 
* Creates correlation information and does t-tests of estimation vs. event periods ; 
 
 
libname sas 'C:\Documents and Settings\ej1095\My Documents\Magic Briefcase\SAS' ;  
 
data ar ; 
proc sort data= ar ;  
proc univariate data = ar noprint ; 
data ar_est ; 
proc sql; 
data ar_all_2 ; 
proc sort data= ar_all_2 ;  
proc means data = ar_all_2 noprint; 
data results ; 
proc means data = ar_all_2 noprint; 
data results_2 ; 
proc means data = ar_all_2 noprint; 
data results_3 ; 
data results_all ; 
data sas.h_uncon_results ; 
data corr_ar_test ; 
proc sort data= corr_ar_test  ;  
PROC TRANSPOSE DATA= corr_ar_test  
proc corr data= transpose_ar  outp= pearson_gen  noprint; * outs= spearman_gen ; 
data pearson_gen_2; 
proc means data = pearson_gen_2 noprint ; 
data pearson_gen_3; 
data corr_mean_2; 
PROC TRANSPOSE DATA= corr_mean_2 
data pearson_ar_4 ; 
data corr_h_test ; 
proc sort data= corr_h_test  ;  
PROC TRANSPOSE DATA= corr_h_test  
proc corr data= transpose_h  outp= pearson_h  noprint; * outs= spearman_gen ; 
data pearson_h_2; 
proc means data = pearson_h_2 noprint ; 
data pearson_h_3; 
data corr_mean_h_2; 
PROC TRANSPOSE DATA= corr_mean_h_2 
data pearson_h_4 ; 
data pearson_all; 
data sas.pearson_all; 
data sas.pearson_ar_4; 
data sas.pearson_h_4; 
PROC EXPORT DATA= WORK.pearson_all 
PROC EXPORT DATA= WORK.pearson_ar_4 
PROC EXPORT DATA= WORK.pearson_h_4 
proc sort data= ar ;  
data ar_est ; 
proc univariate data = ar_est noprint ; 
proc sql; 
data ar_all_2 ; 
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proc ttest data= ar_all_2 ; 
 
data ar_fed ; 
data ar_fed_est ; 
proc univariate data = ar_fed_est noprint ; 
proc sql; 
data ar_fed_3  ; 
proc ttest data= ar_fed_3  ; 
data ar_pres ; 
data ar_pres_est ; 
proc univariate data = ar_pres_est noprint ; 
proc sql; 
data ar_pres_3  ; 
proc ttest data= ar_pres_3  ; 
data ar_local ; 
data ar_local_est ; 
proc univariate data = ar_local_est noprint ; 
proc sql; 
data ar_local_3  ; 
proc ttest data= ar_local_3  ; 
proc means data = ar_local_3 noprint; 
data data_for_GARCH ; 
proc sort data=data_for_GARCH;  
%macro Garch_output; 
   %do i = 1989 %to 2012; 
   data data_for_GARCH_&i  ;  
   proc export data = WORK.data_for_GARCH_&i 
  %end; 
%mend Garch_output; 
%Garch_output 
 
%macro Garch_output_event; 
   %do i = 1989 %to 2012; 
   data data_for_GARCH_event_&i  ;  
   proc export data = WORK.data_for_GARCH_event_&i 
  %end;  
%mend Garch_output; 
%Garch_output_event 
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APPENDIX G – OUTLINE OF GAUSS CODE 
new; cls; 
format /m1 /rd 3,3; 
format /m1 /rd 9,8; 
 
/* This program converts Excel data files to matrix files of returns (ymat) and value weighted returns (xmat) */ 
 
fromdir = "C:\\Ross_garch\\gauss"; 
outdir = "C:\\Ross_garch\\garch\\gauss_output\\";  /* output */ 
 
let n = 46 48 48 49 52 49 49 49 44 45 46 45 40 47 49 60 61 57 50 48 50 48 43 42; 
@The number of firms in the year of question@ 
let yr  = 1   2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24; 
@let yr = 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12;@ 
@The last two digits of the year here @ 
 
st_data=-540; 
ed_data=-41; 
TL=(ed_data-st_data+1);  
nn = 1 ; 
 
do while nn<=24; @ nn<=24 @ 
fromstr1 = fromdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "_1165.xls" ;  
outstr1 = outdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "ymat.xls" ; 
outstr2 = outdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "xmat.xls" ; 
outstr3 = outdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "idvar.xls" ; 
 
vls = reshape(error(0), 9,1); 
vls[4] = 9999.99; 
ret1 = xlsreadm(fromstr1,"a2", 1,vls); 
t1=rows(ret1); 
c1=cols(ret1); 
nfirms=n[nn,.]; 
idvar=zeros(1,nfirms); @idvar is the vector of permno values@ 
indi=ret1[.,2]; 
firmid=indi[2:t1]-indi[1:t1-1]; 
ii=(firmid.ne.0); 
firmn=sumc(ii)+1; @ number of firms @ 
firmi=1|cumsumc(ii)+1; 
yymat=zeros(TL,nfirms); 
xmat=zeros(TL,nfirms); 
 
i=1; 
do while i<=firmn; 
 j=1; 
 subdata=zeros(1,c1); 
 idvar[1,i]=ret1[TL*i,2]; @records a vector of permno id variables @ 
do while j<=t1;  
if firmi[j]==i;  
subdata=subdata|ret1[j,.]; 
endif; 
j=j+1; 
endo; 
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subdata=trimr(subdata,1,0); 
 
st_point=1; 
yy=100*subdata[.,3]; 
xx=100*subdata[.,6]; 
start=subdata[1,4]-st_data+1; 
yymat[.,i]=yy; 
xmat[.,i]=xx; 
if start>st_point;  
 st_point=start;  
endif;  
i=i+1; 
endo; 
 
ymat=trimr(yymat,st_point-1,0);  
xmat=trimr(xmat,st_point-1,0);  
 
outxls1 = xlsWriteM(ymat,  outstr1 , "a2", 1, vls); 
outxls2 = xlsWriteM(xmat,  outstr2 , "a2", 1, vls); 
outxls3 = xlsWriteM(idvar,  outstr3 , "a2", 1, vls); 
 
output on; 
nn; 
output off; 
 
nn=nn+1; 
endo; 
end; 
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/* This code determines the GARCH(1,1) parameters */ 
 
new; cls; 
rndseed  5184; 
library optmum, pgraph; 
format /m1 /rd 9,4; 
 
st_data=-540;  @starting point of estimation period in trading days prior to the event@ 
ed_data=-41;   @end point of estimation period in trading days prior to the event@ 
TL=(ed_data-st_data+1); @TL should be 500 @ 
 
fromdir = "C:\\Ross_garch\\garch\\gauss_output\\"; 
outdir = "C:\\Ross_garch\\garch\\gauss_output\\";  
 
let n = 46 48 48 49 52 49 49 49 44 45 46 45 40 47 49 60 61 57 50 48 50 48 43 42; 
let yr  = 1   2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24; 
longmat=zeros(9,1165); 
 
nn = 1 ; 
gg = 0 ; 
do while nn<=24; @ nn is the number of years in the sample (2012 - 1989 + 1) = 24 @ 
instr1 = fromdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "ymat.xls" ; 
instr2 = fromdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "xmat.xls" ; 
instr3 = fromdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "idvar.xls" ; 
vls = reshape(error(0), 9,1); 
vls[4] = 9999.99; 
ymat = xlsreadm(instr1,"a2", 1,vls); 
xmat = xlsreadm(instr2,"a2", 1,vls); 
idvar = xlsreadm(instr3,"a2", 1,vls); 
file1 = outdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "param.xls" ; 
file2 = outdir $+ "all_param.xls" ; 
redomax=3;   
 
ii=1; 
t=rows(ymat); 
k=cols(ymat); 
x=ones(t,1)~xmat[.,1]; 
np=5;  
residmat=zeros(t+2,k); 
hmat=zeros(t+2,k); 
parammat=zeros(np,k); 
all_mat=zeros(9,k); 
like_mat=zeros(redomax+2,k); 
 
jj=1; 
do while jj<=k;  
PRF=zeros(redomax,np); 
XX=zeros(redomax,np); 
FV=zeros(redomax,1); 
minfout=800; 
redo=0; 
y=ymat[.,jj]; 
do while redo<redomax; 
param1=1*rndn(1,np); 
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_opmiter=1e+3;  /* Max number of iterations */ 
__output=0;  /* No output except the results */ 
{xout,fout,gout,cout}=optmum(&garch_lik,param1); 
PRM_FNL=TRANS(xout); 
if fout==0; 
     cout=1; 
endif; 
  
if cout==0; 
   redo=redo+1; 
     PRF[redo,.]=prm_fnl'; 
     XX[redo,.]=xout'; 
     FV[redo,1]=fout; 
if fout<minfout; 
  minfout=fout; 
  minout=xout; 
endif; 
endif; 
endo; 
 
BIGMAT=FV~PRF~XX; 
RESULTS=sorthc(BIGMAT,1); 
xoutt=results[1,np+2:2*np+1]; 
xoutt=xoutt'; 
like_mat[.,jj]=nn|idvar[1,jj]|results[.,1]; 
est_h=findh(xoutt); 
pf=trans(xoutt); 
parammat[.,jj]=pf; 
resid=y-x*pf[4:4+cols(x)-1]; 
g0=pf[1]; @k is gamma0@ 
g1=pf[3]; @delta is gamma1 on lagged h@ 
g2=pf[2]; @alpha is gamma2 on lagged e@ 
residmat[.,jj]=nn|idvar[1,jj]|resid; 
hmat[.,jj]=nn|idvar[1,jj]|est_h; 
all_mat[.,jj]=nn|idvar[1,jj]|pf[4]|pf[4+cols(x)-1]|g0|g1|g2|est_h[500]|resid[500]; 
gg=gg+1 ; 
longmat[.,gg]=all_mat[.,jj]; 
jj=jj+1; 
endo; 
nn=nn+1; 
endo; 
 
longmat=longmat'; @no export without the transpose command @ 
outxls4 = xlsWriteM(longmat, file2 , "a2", 1, vls);  
end; 
 
@>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<@ 
proc garch_lik(param); 
 @ GARCH(1,1) process @ 
 
local h,u, u2, beta, k, n, alpha, delta,  i, lik;  
param=trans(param); 
n=cols(x); 
k=param[1]; 
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alpha=param[2]; 
delta=param[3]; 
beta=param[4:4+n-1]; 
 
h=zeros(t,1); 
u=(y-x*beta); 
u2=u.^2; 
h[1]= k+ alpha* sumc(u2)/T + delta * sumc(u2)/T;  
lik=.5*ln(2*pi)+.5*ln(h[1])+.5*u2[1]/h[1]; 
i=2; 
do while i<=T; 
h[i]= k + alpha*u2[i-1]+delta*h[i-1]; 
lik=lik + .5*ln(2*pi)+.5*ln(h[i])+.5*u2[i]/h[i]; 
i=i+1; 
endo; 
retp(lik); 
endp; 
 
@>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<@ 
proc findh(param); 
local h,u, u2, beta, k, n, alpha, delta,  i, lik;  
param=trans(param); 
n=cols(x); 
k=param[1]; 
alpha=param[2]; 
delta=param[3]; 
beta=param[4:4+n-1]; 
h=zeros(t,1); 
u=(y-x*beta); 
u2=u.^2; 
h[1]= k+ alpha* sumc(u2)/T + delta * sumc(u2)/T;  
lik=.5*ln(2*pi)+.5*ln(h[1])+.5*u2[1]/h[1]; 
i=2; 
do while i<=T; 
h[i]= k + alpha*u2[i-1]+delta*h[i-1];  
lik=lik + .5*ln(2*pi)+.5*ln(h[i])+.5*u2[i]/h[i]; 
i=i+1; 
endo; 
retp(h); 
endp; 
 
@>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><><<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<@ 
proc trans(pa); 
 local p, a, a1, d1,aaa,ccc; 
p=pa; 
a=pa[1]; 
a1=pa[2]; 
d1=pa[3]; 
p[1]=sqrt(a^2); 
aaa=exp(a1)/(1+exp(a1)); 
ccc=(1-aaa)*exp(d1)/(1+exp(d1)); 
p[2]=aaa; 
p[3]=ccc; 
retp(p); 
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endp; 
 
@>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<@ 
proc cond_ex(k,resid,h,gam0,gam1,gam2); 
 local i,fi,ex; 
  
 if k==0; 
  ex=h; 
  else; 
 fi=0; 
 i=0; 
 do while i<=k-1; 
  fi=fi+gam0*(gam1+gam2)^i; 
  i=i+1; 
  endo; 
 ex=fi+(gam1+gam2)^(k-1)*gam1*h+(gam1+gam2)^(k-1)*gam2*resid^2; 
 endif; 
 retp(ex); 
endp; 
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@ This code calculates q values for each firm-year-day @ 
 
new; cls; 
rndseed  5184; 
library optmum, pgraph; 
format /m1 /rd 9,4; 
 
st_data=-40;  @starting point of event period in trading days prior to the event@ 
ed_data=40;   @end point of event period in trading days prior to the event@ 
T=(ed_data-st_data+1); @TL should always be 81 @ 
 
fromdir = "C:\\Ross_garch\\garch\\gauss_output\\"; 
outdir = "C:\\Ross_garch\\garch\\gauss_output\\";  
 
let n =   46 48 48 49 52 49 49 49 44 45 46 45 40 47 49 60 61 57 50 48 50 48 43 42; 
let yr  =  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24; 
let yr2 = 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012; 
 
long_q=zeros(T+2,1165); 
longer_Q=zeros(T*1165,4); @ cols are year, permno, time, Q @ 
long_m=zeros(T*rows(n),3); 
mtmat=zeros(T,rows(n)); 
h_dif=zeros(T,rows(n)); 
nn = 1 ; 
gg = 0 ; 
qq = 0 ; 
 
do while nn<=24; @ nn is the number of years in the sample (2012 - 1989 + 1) = 24 @ 
instr1 = fromdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "param.xls" ; 
instr2 = fromdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "ymat_event.xls" ; 
instr3 = fromdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "xmat_event.xls" ; 
vls = reshape(error(0), 9,1); 
vls[4] = 9999.99; 
 
parameters = xlsreadm(instr1,"a2", 1,vls); @This is the file with parameters from the estimation period@ 
ar_est = xlsreadm(instr1,"a4", 2,vls); 
ymat = xlsreadm(instr2,"a2", 1,vls); 
xmat = xlsreadm(instr3,"a2", 1,vls); 
file1 = outdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "_h_out.xls" ; 
file2 = outdir $+ "Mstats.xls" ; 
 
firms=cols(ymat); 
x=ones(t,1)~xmat[.,1]; 
t_est=rows(ar_est); 
residmat=zeros(t,firms);  
residout= zeros(t+2,firms); 
hmat=zeros(t,firms);     
hout=zeros(t+2,firms); 
exp_h=zeros(4,firms); 
sum_gamma=zeros(t,firms); 
h_sum=zeros(t,firms); 
h_ahead=zeros(t,firms); 
h_delta=zeros(t,firms); 
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stats_h=zeros(4,firms); 
stats_h[1,.]=parameters[1,.]; 
stats_h[2,.]=parameters[2,.]; 
h_est=zeros(t_est,firms); 
ab_h=zeros(t_est,firms); 
EIDRV=zeros(t,firms); 
Q=zeros(t,firms); 
M_day=zeros(t,3); 
Q_all=zeros(t,firms); 
jj=1; 
do while jj<=firms; 
h_est[.,jj]=(ar_est[.,jj])^2; 
mean_h=sumc(h_est[.,jj])/t_est; 
stats_h[3,jj]=mean_h;     @ mean of est period conditional variance @ 
ab_h[.,jj]=(h_est[.,jj]-mean_h)^2; 
stats_h[4,jj]=sumc(ab_h[.,jj])/(t_est-1);  @ variance of est period conditional variance @ 
residmat[.,jj]=ymat[.,jj]-xmat[.,jj]*parameters[4,jj]; 
hmat[1,jj]=parameters[5,jj]+parameters[6,jj]*(parameters[9,jj])^2 +parameters[7,jj]*parameters[8,jj] ; 
exp_h[1,jj]=parameters[5,jj]; 
exp_h[2,jj]=parameters[6,jj]+parameters[7,jj]; 
exp_h[3,jj]=parameters[6,jj]*parameters[8,jj]; 
exp_h[4,jj]=parameters[7,jj]*(parameters[9,jj])^2; 
h_ahead[1,jj]=exp_h[1,jj]+exp_h[3,jj]+exp_h[4,jj]; @eqn #3 in Bialkowski@ 
EIDRV[1,jj]=(h_ahead[1,jj]*(firms-2)/firms)+ (h_ahead[1,jj]/firms^2); 
h_sum[1,jj]=hmat[1,jj] ; 
k=2; 
do while k<=T; 
hmat[k,jj]= parameters[5,jj]+parameters[6,jj]*(residmat[k-1,jj])^2 +parameters[7,jj]*hmat[k-1,jj];  
j=2 ; 
sum_gamma[1,jj]=1 ; 
do while j<=k; 
sum_gamma[j,jj]=sum_gamma[j-1,jj]+exp_h[2,jj]^j ; 
j=j+1; 
endo; 
h_ahead[k,jj]=(exp_h[1,jj]*sum_gamma[k,jj]) +(exp_h[3,jj]*exp_h[2,jj]^(k-1)) +(exp_h[4,jj]*exp_h[2,jj]^(k-1)) ; 
h_sum[k,jj]=h_sum[k-1,jj]+h_ahead[k,jj] ; 
h_delta[k,jj]=(hmat[k,jj] - stats_h[3,jj])/stats_h[4,jj]; 
k=k+1; 
endo; 
jj=jj+1; 
endo; 
 
EIDRV=(h_ahead*(firms-2)/firms)+ (sumr(h_ahead)/firms^2); 
jjj=1; 
do while jjj<=firms; 
Q[1,jjj]= (((firms*residmat[1,jjj]) - sumr(residmat[1,.]))^2)/(EIDRV[1,jjj]*firms^2); 
M_day[1,3] =  sumr(Q[1,.])/(firms-1);    @This is eqn #5 from Bialkowski@   
M_day[1,1] = yr2[nn] ; 
M_day[1,2] = st_data ; 
longer_Q[(t*(jjj-1)+qq+1),1]= yr2[nn] ; 
longer_Q[(t*(jjj-1)+qq+1),2]= parameters[2,jjj]; 
longer_Q[(t*(jjj-1)+qq+1),3]= st_data ; 
longer_Q[(t*(jjj-1)+qq+1),4]= Q[1,jjj] ; 
kk=2; 
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do while kk<=T; 
Q[kk,jjj] = ((((firms*residmat[kk,jjj]) -  sumr(residmat[kk,.]))^2)/(EIDRV[kk,jjj]*firms^2)) ; 
M_day[kk,3] = sumr(Q[kk,.])/(firms-1);                         @This is eqn #5 from Bialkowski@   
M_day[kk,1] = yr2[nn] ; 
M_day[kk,2] = (kk+st_data-1) ; 
longer_Q[(t*(jjj-1)+qq+kk),1]= yr2[nn] ; 
longer_Q[(t*(jjj-1)+qq+kk),2]= parameters[2,jjj]; 
longer_Q[(t*(jjj-1)+qq+kk),3]= (kk+st_data-1) ; 
longer_Q[(t*(jjj-1)+qq+kk),4]= Q[kk,jjj] ; 
kk=kk+1; 
endo; 
jjj=jjj+1; 
endo; 
mtmat[.,nn]=M_day[.,3]; @ yr2[kk] ~ (kk+st_data-1) ~ @ 
hout=ones(1,firms)*nn|parameters[2,.]|hmat ;  
residout=ones(1,firms)*nn|parameters[2,.]|residmat ;  
EIDRV2=ones(1,firms)*nn|parameters[2,.]|EIDRV ; 
Q_all= ones(1,firms)*nn|parameters[2,.]|Q ; 
long_q[.,(gg+1):(gg+firms)]=Q_all; 
long_M[(t*(nn-1)+1):(t*nn),.]=M_day; 
qq=qq+firms*t ; 
gg=gg+firms ; 
nn=nn+1; 
endo; 
 
h_dif2= yr2'|h_dif ; 
mtmat2=yr2'|mtmat ;  
long_Q2 = long_q' ; 
LQ1=zeros(sumc(n[1:13])*t,4); @ all observations (49410) from 1989 to 2001 @ 
LQ2=zeros(sumc(n[14:rows(n)])*t,4); @ all observations (44955)from 2002 to 2012 @ 
LQ1[1:sumc(n[1:13])*t,.] = longer_Q[1:sumc(n[1:13])*t,.] ; 
LQ2[1:sumc(n[14:rows(n)])*t,.] = longer_Q[sumc(n[1:13])*t+1:sumc(n[1:rows(n)])*t,.] ; 
 
outxls10 = xlsWriteM(long_Q2, file2 , "a2", 1, vls); 
outxls11 = xlsWriteM(long_M, file2 , "a2", 2, vls); 
outxls12 = xlsWriteM(mtmat2, file2 , "a2", 3, vls); 
outxls13 = xlsWriteM(LQ1, file2 , "a2", 4, vls); 
outxls14 = xlsWriteM(LQ2, file2 , "a2", 5, vls); 
 
end; 
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/* This code produces the bootstrap results used to create the distribution */ 
 
new; cls; 
rndseed  5184; 
library optmum, pgraph; 
format /m1 /rd 9,4; 
 
st_data=-540;  @starting point of estimation period in trading days prior to the event@ 
ed_data=-41;   @end point of estimation period in trading days prior to the event@ 
t=(ed_data-st_data+1); @TL should be 500 @ 
 
fromdir = "C:\\Ross_garch\\garch\\gauss_output\\"; 
outdir = "C:\\Ross_garch\\garch\\gauss_output\\";  
 
let n =   46 48 48 49 52 49 49 49 44 45 46 45 40 47 49 60 61 57 50 48 50 48 43 42; 
let yr  =  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24; 
let yr2 = 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012; 
 
fraction = .5; @ 500*.34 = 170 days @ @ remember that 81+170 = 251 @ 
long_m=zeros(rows(n)*t*fraction,4); 
mtmat=zeros(t,rows(n)); 
h_dif=zeros(t,rows(n)); 
nn = 1 ; 
gg = 0 ; 
 
vls = reshape(error(0), 9,1); 
vls[4] = 9999.99; 
file1 = outdir $+ "est_M_for_boot.xls" ; 
do while nn<=24; @ nn is the number of years in the sample (2012 - 1989 + 1) = 24 @ 
instr1 = fromdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "ymat.xls" ; 
instr2 = fromdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "xmat.xls" ; 
instr3 = fromdir $+ ftocv(yr[nn,.],1,0) $+ "param.xls" ; 
ymat_in = xlsreadm(instr1,"a2", 1,vls); 
xmat_in = xlsreadm(instr2,"a2", 1,vls); 
parameters = xlsreadm(instr3,"a2", 1,vls);  
resid_in = xlsreadm(instr3,"a2", 2,vls);   @Est period residual values (AR) @ 
hmat_in = xlsreadm(instr3,"a2", 3,vls);       @Est period h values @ 
firms=cols(ymat_in); 
exp_h=zeros(4,firms); 
ymat = ymat_in[1:(t*fraction),.] ; 
xmat = xmat_in[1:(t*fraction),.] ; 
residmat = resid_in[1:(t*fraction+2),.] ; 
hmat = hmat_in[1:(t*fraction+2),.] ; 
sum_gamma=zeros(fraction*t,firms); 
h_sum=zeros(fraction*t,firms); 
h_ahead=zeros(fraction*t,firms); 
EIDRV=zeros(fraction*t,firms); 
Q=zeros(fraction*t,firms); 
M_day=zeros(fraction*t,4); 
Q_all=zeros(fraction*t,firms); 
jj=1; 
do while jj<=firms; 
exp_h[1,jj]=parameters[5,jj]; 
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exp_h[2,jj]=parameters[6,jj]+parameters[7,jj]; 
exp_h[3,jj]=parameters[6,jj]*hmat[3,jj]; @uses the 1st h value in the estimation period@ 
exp_h[4,jj]=parameters[7,jj]*residmat[3,jj]^2;  @uses the 1st ar value in the estimation period@ 
h_ahead[1,jj]= hmat[3,jj] ; 
EIDRV[1,jj]=(h_ahead[1,jj]*(firms-2)/firms)+ (h_ahead[1,jj]/firms^2); 
h_sum[1,jj]=hmat[1,jj] ; 
k=2; 
do while k<=(fraction*t); 
j=2 ; 
sum_gamma[1,jj]=1 ; 
do while j<=k; 
sum_gamma[j,jj]=sum_gamma[j-1,jj]+exp_h[2,jj]^j ; 
j=j+1; 
endo; 
h_ahead[k,jj]=(exp_h[1,jj]*sum_gamma[k,jj]) +(exp_h[3,jj]*exp_h[2,jj]^(k-1)) +(exp_h[4,jj]*exp_h[2,jj]^(k-1)) ; 
h_sum[k,jj]=h_sum[k-1,jj]+h_ahead[k,jj] ; 
k=k+1; 
endo; 
jj=jj+1; 
endo; 
EIDRV=(h_ahead*(firms-2)/firms)+ (sumr(h_ahead)/firms^2); 
jjj=1; 
do while jjj<=firms; 
kk=2; 
Q[1,jjj]= (((firms*residmat[3,jjj]) - sumr(residmat[3,.]))^2)/(EIDRV[1,jjj]*firms^2); 
M_day[1,1] = yr2[nn] ; 
M_day[1,2] = st_data ; 
M_day[1,3] = sumr(Q[1,.])/(firms-1)  ;    @This is eqn #5 from Bialkowski  @ 
M_day[1,4] = sumr(Q[1,.])/(firms-1) - 1  ; @after it is demeaned@  
do while kk<=(fraction*t); 
Q[kk,jjj] = ((((firms*residmat[kk+2,jjj]) -  sumr(residmat[kk+2,.]))^2)/(EIDRV[kk,jjj]*firms^2)) ; 
M_day[kk,1] = yr2[nn] ; 
M_day[kk,2] = (kk+st_data-1) ; 
M_day[kk,3] = sumr(Q[kk,.])/(firms-1) ;   @This is eqn #5 from Bialkowski @ 
M_day[kk,4] = sumr(Q[kk,.])/(firms-1) - 1 ; @after it is demeaned@  
kk=kk+1; 
endo; 
jjj=jjj+1; 
endo; 
 
output on; 
nn; 
output off; 
 
long_M[(fraction*t*nn-fraction*t+1):(fraction*t*nn),.]=M_day; 
gg=gg+firms; 
nn=nn+1; 
endo; 
 
bootmax = 10000 ; @ 10000 @ 
boots = zeros(bootmax,81); 
boots2 = zeros(bootmax,81); 
critv = zeros(3,81); 
trial = zeros(2,81); 
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boot=1; 
do while boot<=bootmax; 
www=1; 
do while www<=81; 
random=rndn(rows(long_m),1); 
sel = random ~ long_M ; 
sorted = sortc(sel,1); 
trial[1,www] = sorted[1,5];   @ M - 1@ 
if www>1;  
 trial[2,www] = trial[2,(www-1)]+trial[1,www]; 
endif; 
www=www+1; 
endo; 
boots[boot,.]  = trial[1,.] ; 
boots2[boot,.] = trial[2,.] ; 
output on; 
boot; 
output off; 
boot=boot+1; 
endo;  
bt = zeros(bootmax,1); 
e = { .9, .95, .99 };  /* quantile levels */ 
bbb=1; 
do while bbb<=81; 
bt = boots2[.,bbb]; 
critv[.,bbb] = quantile(bt,e); 
bbb=bbb+1; 
endo; 
 
outxls1 = xlsWriteM(long_M,     file1 , "a2", 1, vls); 
outxls2 = xlsWriteM(boots2,     file1 , "a2", 2, vls); 
outxls3 = xlsWriteM(critv,      file1 , "a2", 3, vls); 
 
end; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
130 
 
 
 
    REFERENCES   : 
Agapos, A. M., and Lowell E. Gallaway, 1970, Defense profits and the renegotiation board in the 
aerospace industry, Journal of Political Economy 78, 1093. 
Amihud, Yakov, and Avi Wohl, 2004, Political news and stock prices: The case of Saddam 
Hussein contracts, Journal of Banking & Finance 28, 1185. 
Bai, Jushan, and Pierre Perron, 2003, Computation and analysis of multiple structural change 
models, Journal of Applied Econometrics 18, 1-22. 
Baker, Scott R., Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, Measuring economic policy uncertainty 
(january 1, 2013), Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 13-02. 
Bar-El, Ronen, Kobi Kagan, and Asher Tishler, 2010, Forward-looking versus shortsighted 
defense budget allocation, Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, 638-662. 
Belin, Jean, and Marianne Guille, 2008, Defence and firm financial structure in France, Review 
of Financial Economics 17, 46-61. 
Białkowski, Jędrzej, Katrin Gottschalk, and Tomasz P. Wisniewski, 2008, Stock market 
volatility around national elections, Journal of Banking & Finance 32, 1941-1953. 
Bittlingmayer, George, 1998, Output, stock volatility, and political uncertainty in a natural 
experiment: Germany, 1880-1940, Journal of Finance 53, 2243-2257. 
Boehmer, Ekkehart, Jim Musumeci, and Annette B. Poulsen, 1991, Event-study methodology 
under conditions of event-induced variance, Journal of Financial Economics 30, 253-
272. 
Bollerslev, Tim, 1986, Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, Journal of 
Econometrics 31, 307-327. 
131 
 
 
 
Boutchkova, Maria, Hitesh Doshi, Art Durnev, and Alexander Molchanov, 2012, Precarious 
politics and return volatility, Review of Financial Studies 25, 1111-1154. 
Brown, Stephen J., and Jerold B. Warner, 1980, Measuring security price performance, Journal 
of Financial Economics 8, 205-258. 
Brown, Stephen J., and Jerold B. Warner, 1985, Using daily stock returns: The case of event 
studies, Journal of Financial Economics 14, 3-31. 
Chow, Gregory C., 1960, Tests of equality between sets of coefficients in two linear regressions, 
Econometrica 28, 591-605. 
Chung, Kee H., and Stephen W. Pruitt, 1994, A simple approximation of Tobin's Q, FM: The 
Journal of the Financial Management Association 23, 70-74. 
Clausewitz, Carl von, 1908. On war (Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company, Limited). 
Cooper, Michael J., Huseyin Gulen, and Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, 2010, Corporate political 
contributions and stock returns, Journal of Finance 65, 687-724. 
Demski, Joel S., and Robert P. Magee, 1992, A perspective on accounting for defense contracts, 
Accounting Review 67, 732-740. 
Efron, Bradley, 1979, Bootstrap methods: Another look at the jackknife, Annals of Statistics 7, 1-
26. 
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1961, Farewell radio and television address to the american people, in 
President of the United States, ed.:  (Washington, DC). 
Faccio, Mara, 2006, Politically connected firms, American Economic Review 96, 369-386. 
Faccio, Mara, Ronald W. Masulis, and John J. McConnell, 2006, Political connections and 
corporate bailouts, Journal of Finance 61, 2597-2635. 
132 
 
 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1997, Industry costs of equity, Journal of Financial 
Economics 43, 153-193. 
Fisman, Raymond, 2001, Estimating the value of political connections, American Economic 
Review 91, 1095. 
Golde, Saar, and Asher Tishler, 2004, Security needs, arms exports, and the structure of the 
defense industry: Determining the security level of countries, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 48, 672-698. 
Goldman, Eitan, Jörg Rocholl, and So Jongil, 2009, Do politically connected boards affect firm 
value?, Review of Financial Studies 22, 2331-2360. 
Goldman, Eitan, Jörg Rocholl, and Jongil So, 2013, Politically connected boards of directors and 
the allocation of procurement contracts, Review of Finance 17, 1617-1648. 
Goodell, John W., and Sami Vähämaa, 2013, US presidential elections and implied volatility: 
The role of political uncertainty, Journal of Banking & Finance 37, 1108-1117. 
Goyal, Vidhan K., Kenneth Lehn, and Stanko Racic, 2002, Growth opportunities and corporate 
debt policy: The case of the U.S. Defense industry, Journal of Financial Economics 64, 
35-59. 
Herron, Michael C., Donald Cram, James Lavin, and Jay Silver, 1999, Measurement of political 
effects in the United States economy: A study of the 1992 presidential election, 
Economics & Politics 11, 51-81. 
Hilliard, Jimmy E., and Robert Savickas, 2002, On the statistical significance of event effects on 
unsystematic volatility, Journal of Financial Research 25, 447-462. 
 
133 
 
 
 
Homaifar, Ghassem, William L. Randolph, Billy P. Helms, and Mahmoud Haddad, 1988, 
American presidential elections and returns of defence industry stocks, Applied 
Economics 20, 985-993. 
Huang, Jiekun, and Meng Gao, Capitalizing on Capitol Hill: Informed trading by hedge fund 
managers (april 18, 2011), AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper. 
Hutton, Amy P., Alan J. Marcus, and Hassan Tehranian, 2009, Opaque financial reports, R
2
, and 
crash risk, Journal of Financial Economics 94, 67-86. 
Johnson, Chalmers, 2005, Why we fight, in Eugene Jarecki, ed.:  (Sony Pictures Classics). 
Jones, Steven, and Kevin Banning, 2009, US elections and monthly stock market returns, 
Journal of Economics & Finance 33, 273-287. 
Karpoff, Jonathan M., D. Scott Lee, and Valaria P. Vendrzyk, 1999, Defense procurement fraud, 
penalties, and contractor influence, Journal of Political Economy 107, 809. 
Ke, Zhong, and Donald W. Gribbin, 2009, Are defense contractors rewarded for risk, innovation, 
and influence?, Quarterly Journal of Finance & Accounting 48, 61-73. 
Kim, Chansog, Christos Pantzalis, and Jung Chul Park, 2012, Political geography and stock 
returns: The value and risk implications of proximity to political power, Journal of 
Financial Economics 106, 196-228. 
Knight, Brian, 2007, Are policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the 
Bush/Gore 2000 presidential election, Journal of Public Economics 91, 389-409. 
Kolari, James W., and Seppo Pynnönen, 2010, Event study testing with cross-sectional 
correlation of abnormal returns, Review of Financial Studies 23, 3996-4025. 
134 
 
 
 
Leblang, David, and Bumba Mukherjee, 2005, Government partisanship, elections, and the stock 
market: Examining American and British stock returns, 1930–2000, American Journal of 
Political Science 49, 780-802. 
Leitzel, Jim, 1992, Competition in procurement, Policy Sciences 25, 43-56. 
Li, Jinliang, and Jeffery A. Born, 2006, Presidential election uncertainty and common stock 
returns in the United States, Journal of Financial Research 29, 609-622. 
Lichtenberg, Frank R., 1992, A perspective on accounting for defense contracts, Accounting 
Review 67, 741-752. 
Mayer, Kenneth R., 1990, Patterns of Congressional influence in defense contracting, in Robert 
Higgs, ed.: Arms, politics, and the economy: Contemporary and historical perspectives 
(Holmes & Meier, New York, NY). 
McGowan, Annie S., and Valaria P. Vendrzyk, 2002, The relation between cost shifting and 
segment profitability in the defense-contracting industry, Accounting Review 77, 949-
969. 
Mukherjee, Bumba, and David Leblang, 2007, Partisan politics, interest rates and the stock 
market: Evidence from American and British returns in the twentieth century, Economics 
& Politics 19, 135-167. 
Niederhoffer, Victor, Steven Gibbs, and Jim Bullock, 1970, Presidential elections and the stock 
market, Financial Analysts Journal 26, 111-113. 
Pantzalis, Christos, David A. Stangeland, and Harry J. Turtle, 2000, Political elections and the 
resolution of uncertainty: The international evidence, Journal of Banking & Finance 24, 
1575-1604. 
135 
 
 
 
Patell, James M., 1976, Corporate forecasts of earnings per share and stock price behavior: 
Empirical test, Journal of Accounting Research 14, 246-276. 
Pearson, Rick, 2013, Labor day marks start of Illinois' 2014 campaigns, Chicago Tribune 
(Chicago, IL). 
Rigobon, Roberto, and Brian Sack, 2005, The effects of war risk on us financial markets, Journal 
of Banking & Finance 29, 1769-1789. 
Riley, William B., and William A. Luksetich, 1980, The market prefers Republicans: Myth or 
reality, Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis 15, 541-560. 
Rogerson, William P., 1989, Profit regulation of defense contractors and prizes for innovation, 
Journal of Political Economy 97, 1284. 
Rogerson, William P., 1992, Overhead allocation and incentives for cost minimization in defense 
procurement, Accounting Review 67, 671-690. 
Rogerson, William P., 1994, Economic incentives and the defense procurement process, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 8, 65-90. 
Santa-Clara, Pedro, and Rossen Valkanov, 2003, The presidential puzzle: Political cycles and the 
stock market, Journal of Finance 58, 1841-1872. 
Savickas, Robert, 2003, Event-induced volatility and tests for abnormal performance, Journal of 
Financial Research 26, 165-178. 
Snowberg, Erik, Justin Wolfers, and Eric Zitzewitz, 2007, Partisan impacts on the economy: 
Evidence from prediction markets and close elections, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
122, 807-829. 
Sun, Wu, 1963. Sun Tzu: The art of war (Oxford University Press, New York, NY). 
136 
 
 
 
Stigler, George J., and Claire Friedland, 1971, Profits of defense contractors, American 
Economic Review 61, 692-694. 
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas, 2007, Black swans and the domains of statistics, American Statistician 
61, 198-200. 
Thomas, Jacob K., and Samuel Tung, 1992, Cost manipulation incentives under cost 
reimbursement: Pension costs for defense contracts, Accounting Review 67, 691-711. 
Thompson, Mark, 2008, Obama beats McCain in defense contributions, Time (Washington, DC). 
Weidenbaum, Murray L., 1968, Arms and the American economy: A domestic convergence 
hypothesis, American Economic Review 58, 428. 
White, Halbert, 1980, A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct 
test for heteroskedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817-838. 
Wolfers, Justin, and Eric Zitzewitz, 2009, Using markets to inform policy: The case of the Iraq 
War, Economica 76, 225-250. 
 
  
137 
 
 
 
          ABSTRACT        : 
 
ELECTIONS AND ASSET PRICING: THE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE EQUITY OF 
US MILITARY CONTRACTORS  
by 
MATTHEW MARK ROSS 
August 2014 
Advisor: Dr. Mbodja Mougoué 
Major: Business Administration (Finance) 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
I quantify the relationship between political uncertainty and equity volatility in the 
months around US elections from 1989-2012. The Economic Policy Uncertainty Index and 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data are employed to measure political 
uncertainty faced by military contractors, capitalizing on the unique monopsony-oligopoly 
business environment of these firms. I employ a GARCH (1,1) model with cross-sectionally 
correlated moments to produce daily firm-election volatility measures. Volatility increases 11% 
for local, 27% for midterm, and 43% for presidential elections. These measures demonstrate that 
all election categories: local, federal, presidential, and midterm exhibit differential effects on 
equity volatility. My results contrast prior equity volatility research, showing that equity 
volatility increases much earlier but more gradually for US elections than for international 
(parliamentary) elections. I show that the political uncertainty index values in September predict 
the equity volatility before, during, and after November elections. I present a parsimonious 
piecewise function to model the distinct and predictable daily equity volatility profile in the 
months around US elections. 
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